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The level of frustration with governments and international organizations all over the world 
appears to be rising as international protest movements such as the Occupy movement or the 
Anti-globalization network receive more and more support in their pursuit of fundamental 
change. What these movements seem to have in common, despite their many differences, is a 
deep feeling of dissatisfaction with policies that promote market principles at the expense of 
human, distributive, social, ecological and cultural concerns. 
By and large, decision-making processes in national governments and international 
organizations are informed by an ideology that has come to be known as neo-liberalism. Neo-
liberals believe in the supremacy of market ordering and regard free markets as the key to 
development and economic growth. These ideas are deeply entrenched within both policy 
circles and academia and are advocated by powerful corporations and international 
institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
For decades, progressive groups have battled on different fronts against this form of 
fundamentalism but their efforts have been extremely disjointed and marked by little success. 
Many have fought against each other instead of towards a shared goal and a strategy to unite 
and strengthen these reformist endeavours has not crystallized.  
1. A New Strategy to Counter Neo-Liberalism 
This thesis proposes a new counter-narrative to the neo-liberal agenda that combines two 
seemingly disparate bodies of work: New Governance and Nancy Fraser’s theory of justice. 
New Governance is a new and rapidly growing strand of legal thought and practice that has 
simultaneously developed a following in Europe and the United States. In short, legal scholars 
in this field of research are advocating a shift away from long-standing command-style, fixed-
rule regulation toward more collaborative, bottom-up, and flexible modes of regulation. 
New Governance scholars seek to include private stakeholders in the process of rule-making. 
They contend that these actors are closer to regulatory problems, have superior knowledge 
about local conditions and vaster resources than many states and organizations. Although 
there are some who argue for purely private regulatory schemes, most proponents advocate 
collaborative models that incorporate the state, economic and other stakeholders as equal 
partners in the pursuit of regulatory ends. New Governance models supplement conventional 
rules with more flexible prescriptions, such as principles, guidelines or benchmarks and they 
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accentuate ongoing evaluation, permanent improvement and dynamic learning as fundamental 
principles in the light of constantly changing circumstances.  
New Governance provides an interesting alternative to conventional modes of regulation. Its 
emphasis on private actors is of special importance to this thesis because it offers the 
opportunity for a new democratic strategy for social change. Scholars in this field have 
seldom explored the transformative potential of New Governance on a larger scale and few 
have seen the possibilities of developing it into a project that could challenge neo-liberal 
dominance. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by linking New Governance to a global theory of 
justice.  
Nancy Fraser, an American political scientist and critical theorist, has elaborated a theory 
which synthesises heterogeneous justice discourses into a coherent unifying whole. The core 
of her framework is the normative principle of ‘parity of participation’ which requires ‘… all 
members of society to interact with one another as peers.’1 Impediments to ‘parity of 
participation’ take root in social structures and their removal necessitates three distinct justice 
claims: ‘redistribution’, ‘recognition’ and ‘representation’.2 People need material resources in 
order to participate with others as peers (‘redistribution’) but they also need to be free from 
forms of discrimination (‘recognition’). Moreover, they require a voice to express their 
concerns and to press for ‘recognition’ and ‘redistribution’ in the first place (‘representation’).  
Fraser’s concept of ‘parity of participation’ provides a compelling philosophical basis for 
integrating struggles against neo-liberalism into New Governance models. Ultimately, 
however, such a progressive alliance will require scholars and practitioners within the New 
Governance community to move in two directions: First, they will have to embrace 
participation fully as an organizing principle for their innovative legal techniques and engage 
more proactively with the problems and potential risks of participatory processes. Second, 
they will have to apply their approaches on an international level to tackle forces of injustice 
that transcend boundaries of national states.  
2. The Context of Work 
The framework that this thesis will seek to develop could generate legal rules in the social, 
economic, political, ecological and financial sphere. This is necessary since neo-liberalism is 
not only an economic model in the narrow sense but a political system which permeates all 
aspects of our contemporary life. The focus of this thesis will be primarily on issues of work, 
                                                
1 Fraser 2010, 365. 
2 Fraser 2009, 65. 
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and the aforementioned aspects will be considered insofar as they impact on work relations 
and institutions of work (national and global regulations, unions and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO)).   
Most people need to work in order to secure an adequate income and social security for 
themselves and their families. Work has always been a pivotal human activity and a main site 
of political struggle. Any progressive strategy that seeks to alter societal structures therefore 
needs to incorporate the dimension of work and to understand how work relations have been 
organized at a particular point in time. Rittich summarizes the importance of work at the 
current conjuncture: 
‘Work continues to function, in the new economy as in the old, as a dense transfer 
point at which concerns ranging from social inclusion, stability, equality, and 
democracy to economic growth and competitiveness, converge, intermingle, and 
sometimes conflict. For these reasons, appreciating the transformation of work and 
work norms is central to grasping the changes of pursuing both economic growth 
along with security and social justice in the contemporary world.’3 
Chapter two of this thesis will analyse how the institutions that govern work and work 
relations have changed since World War Two. A historical perspective is important not least 
because it gives a clear picture of how market fundamentalism has incrementally dismantled 
institutions that had previously given a voice and security to workers but also because it 
provides insight into what a strategy to improve working conditions and protections for the 
future might look like. To be sure, work patterns have fundamentally changed since the global 
integration of national markets, and the welfare states of the post-war era were, as we will see, 
by no means a paradise for all workers. However, some institutional elements or principles 
that regulated work during that period may be worth rediscovering or revitalizing.  
The progressive New Governance model that is advocated by this thesis is based on full and 
equal participation. All workers therefore who are potentially affected by the regulatory 
problems that this model attempts to address have a right to participate in it. This is of special 
importance in a neo-liberal context where great disparities of wealth and influence foreclose 
opportunities of workers to affect public policies. At bottom participation is about power, and 
workers need a great deal of it in their daily struggles against repressive forms of injustice. 
3. Overview of Chapters 
Chapter two will set the background for the main reflections. It will start with a summary of 
Karl Polanyi’s classic book ‘The Great Transformation’ in which he contends that the implicit 
                                                
3 Rittich 2010, 565. 
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goal of market advocates is to disembed the economy from society. The thesis will provide 
three interpretations of this statement and use the term disembeddedness as an analytical tool 
to assess the socio-economic and political developments since World War Two. For reasons 
given above, particular attention will be paid to work relations and institutions of work. The 
chapter will distinguish between an embedded phase (1945 to about 1975) and a disembedded 
phase (since about 1975).4 After highlighting some contemporary tendencies it will conclude 
that disembeddedness is still very much the defining characteristic of our present time.  
Chapter three will provide an overview of the two building blocks that could, in my opinion, 
form the basis for a counter hegemonic strategy to the neo-liberal agenda. It will first present 
the essential features of Fraser’s theory of justice and analyse its relevance to the current 
political economy. The aspect of ‘representation’ will receive particular attention since it 
accentuates, as we will see, what is first and foremost missing in a globally integrated market. 
The chapter will then proceed with some observations about the nature of legal rules and ask 
under which conditions law can be used as an instrument for social change. Following this, it 
will trace, in some detail, the origin of New Governance and analyse its defining 
characteristics. Two examples of New Governance techniques will be presented at this point 
to highlight the application of these characteristics in practice.  
Chapter four will describe how Fraser’s theory of justice can be integrated into New 
Governance models. It will first discuss particular errors and omissions of both New 
Governance scholarship and Fraser’s work and indicate how they could partly be resolved if 
the two concepts were combined. It is then argued that the best way to achieve successful 
integration of the two models is by ensuring that participation as a process right fulfils the 
following three criteria:  No restrictions on subject matter; allowance for any and all possible 
outcomes in the terms of bargaining; and the full inclusion of all potentially affected by 
decisions in the participatory process. 
Chapter five will consider the implications of integrating Fraser’s work into New Governance 
models by analyzing particular strengths, limitations and risks of participatory processes. The 
chapter will expand around three constitutive questions: ‘who?’, ‘how?’ and ‘what?’ of 
participation and so, hopes to bring some structure to a discussion that has been widely 
underappreciated in the academic literature of New Governance thus far. The analysis will be 
based on theories of power developed by Steven Lukes and John Gaventa and conclude that 
without a comprehensive examination of existing power relations and specific interventions 
                                                
4 The chapter will draw largely on Standing 2009, who uses the same distinction with reference to Polanyi. 
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that target power imbalances (redistributive efforts and measures against discrimination), the 
proposed model will not bring about the fundamental change that it aspires to. 
Chapter six will deal with one of the major challenges for labour lawyers and activists in an 
era of neo-liberal predominance: The regulation of transnational corporations. In order to 
understand the complex relationships between different parties in global production networks 
and the situation of workers in particular, the thesis will make use of an analytical and 
methodological lens known as value chain analysis (VCA). It will then demonstrate how, in 
practice, the proposed New Governance model can foster ‘parity of participation’ for 
increasingly marginalised workers within such chains of production.  
Finally, the focus will shift to a critique of the ILO’s ‘decent work’ agenda from the 
perspective of Fraser’s theory of justice. The agenda, it is argued, only superficially touches 
on key dimensions of ‘parity of participation’ (representation, recognition, redistribution) and 
is therefore unlikely, on its own, to provide workers with the means necessary to fight the 
most serious forms of injustice wrought by neo-liberal policies. 
The final chapter will consolidate the findings and emphasize two measures as particularly 
important for the success of the proposed New Governance model: Capacity building by non-
economic stakeholders and political pressure backed by collective action.  
A word of caution seems appropriate. The nature of this thesis is interdisciplinary, largely 
theoretical, future-oriented and experimental. A full and comprehensive analysis of all issues 
that are at stake is beyond the scope of this small project and would require further studies. 
With that in mind I do, however, hope that the ideas presented in this thesis will stimulate 
some debate among progressive lawyers who are interested in alternative democratic designs 










II. THE NEO-LIBERAL CHALLENGE 
This chapter will, in a cursory manner, chronicle the socio-economic and political 
developments since World War Two from the perspective of workers. Karl Polanyi’s concept 
of disembeddedness will be used to analyse the relationship between markets and the society 
in three different periods: The post-war welfare states, the neo-liberal era and the present 
time. The term disembeddedness will again become pertinent in chapter three where it is 
argued that Fraser’s concept of ‘parity of participation’ could provide the basis for New 
Governance models to counter market fundamentalism with a view to re-embed the economy 
in society. 
1. Karl Polanyi’s ‘Great Transformation’ 
In his canonical work ‘The Great Transformation’5 Karl Polanyi depicted the rise of the 
market economy in the 19th century and its fall in the 1930s as a ‘double movement’6: ‘The 
market expanded continuously but this movement was met by a countermovement checking 
its expansion in definite directions.’7 The first aspect of this ‘double movement’ is described 
as an attempt by financial and industrial capital to create a market society in which land, 
labour and money were turned into commodities. This triggered a crisis with devastating 
effects on the fabric of social life. Following the destruction of regulation, mechanisms of 
redistribution and cultural institutions, people were left with the prospect of starvation, broken 
social bonds and a severely despoiled nature. Polanyi’s famous distinction between an 
economy that is embedded in society (subject to non-economic regulation) and an economy 
that is disembedded from society (only governed by supply and demand) has its origin in 
these observations. Disembeddedness, in Polanyi’s view, was an implicit objective of the 
market society, albeit one that, due to the second aspect of the ‘double movement’, could not 
become a reality. In the 1930s, a spontaneous and, according to Polanyi, necessary 
countermovement emerged which mobilised against the threats to people’s livelihoods and 
pushed for new forms of regulation and social protection.8 This countermovement led to 
fascism and World War Two but also laid the foundation for the post-war welfare states 
which re-embedded the economy in society.  
                                                
5 For a reappraisal of Polanyi’s approach see, inter alia, Block 2003, Bugra and Agartan 2007, Standing 2009, 
Muukkonen 2009, Fraser 2013. 
6 Polanyi 1944, 130. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Polanyi’s countermovement echoes Marxist thought although it is relatively disorganised and transcends class 
lines. On a theoretical level, there are more fundamental differences between the two thinkers: Polanyi depicts 
capitalist countries as a battlefield between forces of marketization and social protection, whereas Marx’s 
framework is one of ‘… class struggles based on a clash of economic interests’, Maertens 2008, 142 and 151. 
For a short critique of Polanyi’s two-sided approach see also chapter three, section three. 
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The concept of disembeddedness has become an indispensable point of reference in current 
discussions about globalization. It is all the more surprising that a clear definition of the term 
has not yet emerged. This thesis will develop three different interpretations of this theoretical 
concept which highlight related but distinct elements of market agendas in particular, and the 
relationship between the economy and the society more generally.  
First, neo-liberals, just like their predecessors in the 19th and early 20th century, believe that 
the laws of supply and demand should regulate all aspects of human lives. Disembeddedness 
captures this insight by evoking a picture of imbalance between economic and other interests.  
The term indicates that the economy has been singled out of a pool of equally legitimate 
concerns and is receiving unique attention. The prefix ‘dis-’, moreover, intimates that the 
economy has moved away from its original and, most significantly, its natural locus. Non-
economic aspects need to be taken into account not only because there has always been 
human interaction outside of markets but also because markets themselves have always been 
social institutions constituted by people with non-economic motivations and concerns. 
Second, and in a similar vein, disembeddedness alludes to a loss of grip and control over 
economic processes. As we shall see in the course of this and the following chapter, spaces 
for workers to collectively challenge market hegemony are either closed off, altogether absent 
or, in the few cases where they are accessible, do not allow for equal chances of interested 
parties to express their concerns. Institutions such as the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and unions provided a powerful voice to workers in the post-war years but their 
relevance has dramatically waned under the influence of neo-liberal policies. 
A third line of interpretation operates on an individual level and examines the degree to which 
human beings are dependent on market forces for their socio-economic wellbeing.9 
Understood in this way, disembeddedness alludes to the absence of adequate safeguards 
which protect those outside labour markets (unemployment benefits, social welfare, disability 
support etc) or those who work (adequate income, legal protection and social entitlements). 
2. The Embedded Phase  
In the three decades after World War Two, the main policies and institutions concerned with 
work were informed by a model of industrial labour which regarded the employer and 
employee as the two key protagonists.10 Employees in full-time labour were to receive social 
and legal protections in return for accepting the employers’ control over their work as well as 
                                                
9 It is this last interpretation that figures largely in Standing’s canvas. 
10 Standing 2009, 4. 
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the right to retain profits.11  Redistributive conflicts between capital and labour were resolved 
through an active fiscal policy12 and through centralised collective bargaining processes, with 
governments in a mediating role.13  
The essential body in forging and disseminating the legal underpinnings of industrial labour 
during this period was the International Labour Organization (ILO) via its system of 
conventions and non-binding recommendations.14 ‘Without saying it, the ILO stood for a 
model of national welfare capitalism, in which the standard employment relationship was the 
presumed norm.’15 The ILO has always been based on a tripartite structure that includes 
workers, employers and governments in its constituting bodies, the International Labour 
Conference (ILC) and the Governing Body (GB). Workers and employers each hold one 
quarter of the seats while governments hold the remaining half. Labour standards promulgated 
by these three parties were warmly welcomed by politicians of various ideological stripes. 
They offered a ready formula for stability and increased welfare of the working class who had 
suffered during World War Two and the Great Depression.16 
Labour unions also contributed to the rise of ‘labourism’.17 Among their prime concerns 
figured the enlargement of income and social security for workers in standard employment as 
well as the maximization of the number of people in such jobs.18 Meanwhile, freedom of 
association for other categories of workers, including those in part-time jobs, the self-
employed, contract workers, independent contractors and those engaged in service-, 
agricultural- or domestic work remained largely unrealized.19 
The entire post-war consensus was conceptualised for a world of closed national economies 
that removed labour costs from competition between states. ‘Trade took place primarily 
between countries with similar levels of labour security and cost structures …’20 and was 
                                                
11 Social and legal protections include: Laws against unfair dismissal, health and safety regulation, assurances of 
adequate income (to sustain a male breadwinner and his dependants), voice in a union, medical aid, 
unemployment benefits, maternity leave, disability benefits, pension and so on. Control may refer to eight 
aspects: Self-government, control over time, control over means of production, control over raw materials, 
control over work content, control over skill reproduction, control over output and control over income, ibid., 21. 
The employer’s right to retain profit means that employers receive a ‘disproportionate share of the economic 
surplus’ for taking the risk of investment, ibid., 37. 
12 ‘The main motors for reducing income inequality were capital taxation, [progressive] income tax and subsidies 
on goods and services consumed by workers and low income communities’, ibid., 44. 
13 Ibid. See the discussion about the ILO and unions below. 
14 Ibid., 33f. 
15 Ibid., 34.  
16 Ibid., 1. 
17 Ibid., 46f. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 55. 
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divided between developing countries that produced primary goods and developed countries 
that produced manufactured goods and services.21 In general, however, import substitution 
was the prevailing norm of the time, and high tariffs and other trade barriers were the means 
to implement it.  In line with such policies, efforts were made to keep the financial system 
under control. Restrictive measures on banks and other financial institutions accompanied a 
myriad of rules to curb international capital movements.22 
Together these institutional mechanisms created an environment of relative embeddedness 
through which a very specific compromise between capital and labour was preserved. With 
respect to the first interpretation of the term (dis)embeddedness we can conclude that 
labourism cut down market excesses and fostered a variety of equally important concerns 
(relative balance). The policy consensus was that social and human aspects deserve equal 
attention vis-à-vis economic interests and that adjustments which furthered only one aspect at 
the expense of others would need to be justified with regard to the public interest. Second, the 
ILO and unions gave a powerful voice to industrial workers through which they were able to 
collectively challenge capital interests. At least in developed countries, the level of union 
membership was high and the ILO was widely regarded as an authority in the field of labour 
standards. Third, industrial workers and their family members were protected by social and 
legal entitlements. Labour laws provided security for various risks and contingencies at work 
and also installed safeguards for many who were without a job. People were thus not 
completely dependent on market forces for their socio-economic well-being. 
However, the system of labourism was flawed in fundamental ways and should not be 
idealised.23 Labourism discriminated against women, the service industry, agriculture, home 
workers and all forms of work that deviated from the standard employment norm.24 It also 
turned a blind eye to reproductive activities, such as care work, and gave little attention to 
migrants and occupational communities.25 Socio-economic protection was still largely 
conditional upon labour market participation and came at a huge price: Those fortunate 
enough to be in full-time employment lost their freedom to an employer who dictated and 
controlled the entire work process.26 I hasten to add a feature that has often been overlooked, 
namely that the welfare systems were partially financed by those newly independent countries 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Kennedy 2006, 108. 
23 Standing 2009, 6 and Rittich 2010, 566. 
24 Standing 2009, 41ff. 
25 Ibid. Care work, mostly done by women, went largely uncompensated although markets would not be able to 
operate without it.   
26 Ibid.  
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in the south that had been forced into relationships of unequal exchange by their former 
colonizers. 
2. The Disembedded Phase 
The post-war consensus was replaced in the 1970s and 1980s by a new doctrine - later termed 
neo-liberalism - which gave normative priority to competitiveness and efficiency. Laws and 
institutional arrangements were revised so as to facilitate the allocation of resources to their 
most productive use.27 Economic imperatives spread not only into governments but permeated 
all aspects of social life. The most significant change, however, concerned the reach of the 
market economy. Since national borders were perceived as a hindrance to investment and 
economic growth, active measures were taken to create a globally integrated market.    
At the core of this neo-liberal reform agenda was an unholy alliance between the global 
financial institutions (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organization)28, powerful transnational corporations29 and the Chicago School of 
economics.30 Another critical impulse came from technological innovations which simplified 
and accelerated the movement of goods, services, capital and information.31  
Once liberalization was underway there was sustained pressure to cut labour costs.32 Firms 
could relocate to countries where labour was inexpensive and worker protection weak 
(outsoucing, offshoring) which essentially undermined the bargaining power of workers 
everywhere in the world.33 Employers who previously carried the risk of investment 
(fluctuating demand, poor product quality, the ill health of workers etc) were now able to shift 
uncertainties and insecurities onto workers who had to make concessions in order to keep 
their jobs. Other demographic shifts such as the feminization of labour and growing migration 
contributed to this trend by providing labour markets with additional cheap human resources. 
                                                
27 Under normal circumstances this meant enabling private transactions. 
28 The adoption of neo-liberal reforms by developing countries was often a result of pressure exerted by the IMF 
and WB (conditionality, structural adjustment), see Kennedy 2006, 131. Alongside the WTO, other free trade 
regimes (EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and many bilateral agreements) have contributed to a globally 
integrated market.  
29 The economic elite have been able to influence state policies in their favour through lobbying, use of the 
media and political funding.  
30 Drawing from Hayek, Friedman and other liberals, this school came to dominate the academic world and 
government circles in the late 70s. ‘Its members took over the main economic journals and powerful committees 
awarding research funds. It is a measure of their dominance that between 1980 and 2008 no fewer than 17 of the 
Nobel Prizes in Economics went to former or current Chicago economists’, Standing 2009, 62. 
31 Arthurs 2001, 274. 
32 Standing 2009, 58. 
33 Ibid., 63. The threat of outsourcing and offshoring is a powerful political tool but actual outsourcing and 
offshoring has also been growing – particularly in the financial sector, ibid., 73f. 
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A key objective of the neo-liberal agenda was the creation of a flexible labour system for the 
sake of economic growth:34 ‘Flexibility meant a regime of employment at will, where the 
government imposed no restrictions on hiring, firing or working conditions. Rather, 
employers and workers were free to choose terms that were convenient for them.’35 A flexible 
labour regime gave disproportionate power to employers and contributed to the rise of 
contingent, casual, precarious and informal work.36 Only adaptable, high-end employees 
could take advantage of the new freedoms and negotiate terms which were favourable to 
them. For most employees, however, flexibility came with a curtailment of legal and social 
entitlements. Seen in this context, declining relative returns to workers in relation to those of 
capital and stagnant real wages37 must be understood as an integral, rather than an accidental 
part of the regulatory neo-liberal framework.  
Collective bargaining had played an essential role in the post-war years but it was now 
increasingly replaced by individual contracts. The growth of the service industry, where 
collective bargaining had always been the exception rather than the norm, contributed to this 
trend. But even in the manufacturing economy the level and density of union membership 
declined. Moreover, the strongest advocate for collective bargaining on the global level, the 
ILO, became a target of neo-liberal critique and lost significant influence with the withdrawal 
of the United States as its most important sponsor.38 
A further major change concerned the character of trade: The economic landscape has come 
to be dominated by transnational companies with production networks and global supply 
chains in developing countries.39 Risks and employment functions are transferred down by the 
lead firm to sub-contractors and suppliers with very little bargaining power.40 Not only did 
this development further entrench disparities between countries in the south and the north, it 
has also raised questions of transparency and accountability: The use of agencies, 
intermediaries and contract workers can make it extremely complicated to determine who is 
responsible for employment conditions and wages.41 
Access to state benefits became more difficult. In order to qualify for unemployment benefits, 
health care and social welfare, people needed to display certain behaviour and verify 
                                                
34 Other benefits that have at times been attributed to flexible labour regimes are more jobs, greater market 
participation of women and young people and lower unemployment levels, see Santos 2009 44f. 
35 Ibid., 45.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Standing 2009, 63 and 78f. 
38 See also chapter seven, section one. 
39 Von Broembsen 2012a, 5. 
40 For Standing 1999 a characteristic of ‘organizational flexibility’. 
41 Standing 2009, 85. 
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increased contributions.42 With private insurance options thriving, average levels of pensions 
declined in many countries.43 Here, too, increased levels of contributions were necessary to 
obtain adequate allowance for retirement.44 All these benefits became less universal and more 
conditional upon market participation.45 
Fiscal policy in the 80s ceased to function as a mechanism of progressive redistribution.46 
Anxious to attract or sustain investment, policy makers everywhere began to give more 
deference to business interests and investor rights. The tax burden on capital was lowered 
incrementally while, at least relatively, workers’ taxes were increased.47 Many corporations 
discovered legal and illegal ways to avoid taxes resulting in empty public pockets which 
workers were asked to fill again.48 Subsidies on goods and services relevant to low income 
workers were curbed while those for capital were increased.49 Newly emerging industries 
such as telecommunications, computers, internet etc were heavily subsidised by states.50 
Moreover, corporations and financial institutions that took risks and suffered losses could 
count on the state to jump in with rescue plans at any time. 
The net result was an economy increasingly disembedded from society. Neo-liberalism 
sacrificed the post-war values of social protection, solidarity and equality for the virtues of 
competitive markets. The picture of imbalance that underpins the first of the three 
interpretations of disembeddedness provided above is perfectly incisive. Social, human or 
ecological aspects were subordinated to the laws of supply and demand and received attention 
only insofar as they did not impede efficient markets. A measure of unease is also warranted 
if one considers the declining influence of those organizations that had previously given a 
powerful voice to workers – the ILO and unions. On an individual level finally, workers 
increasingly came to rely on market participation and their personal bargaining capabilities to 
secure an adequate standard of living. In order to avoid outright exclusion from labour 
markets many were forced to accept jobs on any terms that were offered.  
 
 
                                                
42 Ibid., 81. 
43 Ibid., 82. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 65.  
47 Corporate tax rates in the OECD moved from 45 per cent in the 80s to below 29 per cent in 2005, see ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 83. 
50 Chang 2002, 548. 
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3. The New Free Market: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing  
The present time is characterized by capital being ‘more mobile and powerful’51 than ever 
before. Financial institutions directly determine the fates of millions of workers through their 
operations in international stock markets. Virtually no week goes by without a new massive 
takeover or merger. Private equity funds with little intention for productive investment buy up 
companies in bulk, cut jobs, and resell what is left to foreign best bidders.  
Many financial services are geared towards short term profits and involve highly speculative 
activities. This produces insecurities not only for workers, but for society as a whole. The 
amount of money generated by such services has steadily increased during the last decades 
and few experts believe that the financial meltdown will stop or even reverse this trend.52 
Particularly alarming are new data on inequality which reveal a widening gap between rich 
and ordinary people and an increased ‘concentration’ of wealth within a small fraction of the 
population.53  
Workers today are expected to learn new skills, change jobs more often and accept degrading 
work conditions as well as low levels of social and legal protection. The significance of 
collective bargaining is further declining while private contracts proliferate both across 
industries and geographies.54 The omnipresent temptations of outsourcing and offshoring 
continue to create downward pressure on social and legal protection for workers. Countries 
who want to remain competitive and attract foreign corporations need to offer a legal 
environment that is conducive to investment.  
Many governments have also failed to adjust their labour laws to new patterns of work. Their 
laws remain faithful to an employer/employee dualism which excludes a growing number of 
extremely vulnerable workers – especially those in the informal economy and (in)dependent 
contractors. Such omissions constitute a form of ‘implicit deregulation’55 which allows big 
corporations to transfer many of the risks described in the previous section. 
These observations suggest that disembeddedness is still very much the status quo. However, 
some voices in different academic circles are claiming that a major paradigm shift is 
happening as we enter the twenty-first century. For instance, Trubek and Santos argue that a 
                                                
51 Wedderburn 2007, 397. 
52 In 2007, financial services accounted for 40 per cent of corporate returns in the United States (as opposed to 
10 per cent in 1980), Standing 2009, 59. 
53 Rittich 2008, 238ff and Rittich 2010, 567f. 
54 Union representation has reached post-war low points in many countries, see Arthurs 2011, Fischl 2011a.  
55 Rittich 2009, 572. 
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‘new law and development mainstream vision’56 is on the rise, which marks a significant 
departure from neo-liberal ideology. This vision takes on two different forms:  
‘Mainstream development thinkers continue to stress the importance of markets as 
the main mechanism for production and distribution of resources in societies and 
as the main leverage for economic growth. But they now also recognize that there 
may be significant market failures, which could justify state intervention. […] 
Second, there is an appeal for a reconceptualization of development that would 
decentre the focus on economic growth. Advocates of this view argue that 
development policies should broaden their scope in the pursuit of human 
development, of which income is only an aspect, and equal consideration should 
be paid to political, social and legal development.’57 
There is little reason to assume that the first path carries the potential to re-embed the 
economy in society since it fails to engage with the normative assumptions of the neo-liberal 
agenda. Proponents of this stream of thought accept the primacy of market ordering and 
believe that the correction of market failures alone will suffice to set things right. In their 
professional vernacular is no room for ideas that reach beyond the laws of supply and demand 
and I worry that following their footprints will, in the long run, reinforce political strategies 
that should be challenged.  
People who oppose market hegemony, that is, ‘… people who persist in thinking and acting as 
if politics or families or culture or ethics mattered …,’58 are more likely to turn to ideas of the 
second path. It is not difficult to find contemporary discussion that is informed by these ideas. 
Indeed, much of what is happening today in epistemic communities and in international 
financial and economic institutions has the imprimatur of a more holistic version of 
development.59 However, as Rittich has repeatedly pointed out, numerous new strategies that 
emphasise non-economic aspects remain deeply anchored in a neo-liberal framework.60 This 
can be exemplified with the World Bank’s ‘second generation’ program which is 
paradigmatic of how the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have come to respond to 
critiques on social and democratic deficits. The ‘reformed agenda’ includes a host of social, 
structural and human concerns but it leaves the legal background rules of efficient and 
competitive markets largely ‘unmodified’.61 As a consequence, the central mode to promote 
                                                
56 Trubek and Santos 2006, 4. 
57 Ibid., 6f. 
58 Arthurs 2001, 274. 
59 According to Rittich 2004, a revival of social aspects can be traced back to the World Bank’s comprehensive 
development framework (CDF) of 1999 and is also reflected on the wider international level through the 
endorsement of the Millennium Development Goals, see ibid., 200f. 
60 See, inter alia, Rittich 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. 
61 Rittich 2004, 225. 
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social ends becomes the market itself!62 This is a very dangerous development since it 
effectively immunizes neo-liberalism against critique. It also gives new force to the idea of 
the self-regulating market that can now be articulated in the language of social justice. 
Similarly, the OECD’s ‘job strategy’ from 2006, the revised version of a highly influential 
report on labour market regulation and social policy, continues to accentuate flexibility as the 
main driver not only for growth, but also for social justice and equality.63 The parameter used 
to measure success both socially and economically is labour market participation – i.e. the 
number of people in jobs as opposed to the terms of their participation. 64 Employment 
securities or social entitlements as part of the employment relationship are perceived as 
obstacles to the efficient functioning of labour markets and are only tolerated if they flow 
naturally from bargaining processes between employers and employees.65 
In the past, liberals have acknowledged the adverse effects of market forces even though most 
may have succumbed to the idea that, in the long run, everybody stands to benefit from 
economic growth. In a metaphorical sense then, the market was a wolf in wolf’s clothing. The 
‘job strategy’ and the ‘second generation’ reform program embody a new market idiom that 
obscures the link between negative social outcomes and neo-liberal ideology. Decorated in the 
vocabulary of social justice, the free market has come to be the first guarantor of better social 
outcomes. It has become a wolf in sheep’s clothing. 
The thesis so far, has given an overview of the socio-economic and political developments 
since World War Two from the perspective of workers. It has argued that neo-liberal ideas 
dominate in policy circles and large parts of the academic community and that voices who 
argue differently (see Trubek and Santos above) need to be treated with caution.  
It is now time to move a step further and look at those two building blocks that could, in my 
opinion, form the basis for a counter hegemonic strategy to the neo-liberal agenda with a view 
to re-embed the economy in society: Nancy Fraser’s theory of justice and New Governance. 
 
 
   
 
                                                
62 Rittich 2006, 428. 
63 Rittich 2008, 251. The only notable extension of that framework is the goal to improve training and skills of 
workers, ibid. 
64 Ibid., 235. 
65 Ibid., 267. 
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III. FRASER’S THEORY OF JUSTICE AND NEW GOVERNANCE 
Nancy Fraser provides a clear and comprehensive philosophical framework that takes account 
of the growing interdependence in a globalizing economy. This chapter will present her 
theory in general terms before applying it to the context of work. The dimension of 
‘representation’ will receive particular attention since it accentuates what is, in my opinion, 
the most crucial deficit in a world dominated by neo-liberalism. In order to link Fraser’s work 
to practice, the chapter will refer to a broad school of legal thought known as New 
Governance. This school breaks with many assumptions typically associated with law-
making. Most, importantly, it regards states and private stakeholders as equal partners in the 
pursuit of regulatory ends and is thus open to ‘representation’ for various categories of 
workers. The chapter will trace the origin of New Governance and highlight its defining 
characteristics. Following that, it will present two examples of New Governance techniques to 
highlight the application of these characteristics in practice.  
1. ‘Parity of Participation’: A Three-Dimensional Approach to Justice 
Nancy Fraser’s philosophical framework is built on the notion of ‘parity of participation’ 
which she regards as a democratic version of the old principle of equal respect.66 ‘Parity of 
participation’ requires ‘social arrangements’ that allow ‘… all members of society to interact 
with one another as peers.’67 This means that people need to be able to interact with one 
another on equal terms and as ‘full partners’ across various spheres of social life, including, 
inter alia, the economy, politics, family, culture and sport.68 
‘Parity of participation’ integrates three different claims of social justice: ‘redistribution’, 
‘recognition’ and ‘representation’.69  
‘Redistribution’ forms a critical component of Fraser’s framework since people need material 
resources to participate with others as peers. If they are denied these resources, they are 
subject to ‘distributive injustice’ or ‘maldistribution’.70 Although Fraser does not argue for a 
particular set of distributive policies, the concept of ‘parity of participation’ clearly precludes 
forms of gross disparities of wealth, exploitation and poverty.  
                                                
66 Fraser 2009, 16. 
67 Fraser 2010, 365. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Fraser 2009, 16f. In her earlier work, Fraser only advocated a two-dimensional approach to ‘parity of 
participation’ based on ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’, see Fraser 1998 or 2003. 
70 Ibid., 16. 
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‘Recognition’ aims to dismantle ‘… institutionalised hierarchies of cultural value.’71  In 
simple terms, this dimension of Fraser’s framework seeks to eliminate forms of discrimination 
based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, nationality, ethnicity etc. People who 
suffer from discrimination do not have equal chances to attain ‘social esteem’ and are 
therefore subject to what Fraser calls ‘status inequality’ or ‘misrecognition’.72 
‘Representation’, finally, serves the agenda of providing individuals with equal political 
voice. On one level, unsound procedural rules might hinder people’s ability to express 
concerns within their own community. The means to remedy such obstacles to ‘parity of 
participation’ are usually found within the typical political-science discourses over ‘gender 
quotas on electoral lists’, ‘multicultural rights’, ‘cumulative voting’ and the like.73 Fraser calls 
this type of injustice ‘ordinary-political misrepresentation’ and contrasts it with ‘misframing’ 
which according to her constitutes a ‘meta-political injustice’.74  
The latter occurs if the ‘boundaries’ of political communities exclude people from making 
claims of social justice.75 The crucial question here is whether someone is considered as a 
subject of justice in the first place. Fraser contends that the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, 
which regards the sovereign territorial state as the appropriate unit for justice claims and the 
sole basis for determining the subjects of justice, is unable to resolve the most pressing 
problems in a globalizing world:  
‘Increasingly subject to contestation, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is now 
considered by many to be a major vehicle of injustice, as it partitions political 
space in ways that block many who are poor and despised from challenging the 
forces that oppress them. Channelling their claims into the domestic space of 
relatively powerless, if not wholly failed, states, this frame insulates offshore 
powers from critique and control. Among those shielded from the critique of 
justice are more powerful predator states and transnational private powers, 
including foreign investors and creditors, international currency speculators, and 
transnational corporations. Also protected are the governance structures of the 
global economy, which set exploitative terms of interaction and then exempt them 
from domestic control.’76 
Thus, if forms of injustice move across borders, claims of ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ 
can only be successful if the frame is not confined to the nation-state. Fraser herself argues 
that the frame of justice should be expanded to include all those ‘… who are subject to a 
                                                
71 Ibid. 
72 Fraser 2010, 365. 
73 Fraser 2009, 62. 
74 Ibid., 6, 19. 
75 Ibid. 
76  Many contemporary philosophical frameworks still operate on a domestic level which makes them 
unconvincing in times of globalization. 
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given governance structure’ (the ‘all-subjected principle’).77 Establishing the ‘who’ of justice 
(its subjects) in this way rejects references to nationality or geographic proximity but demands 
an answer to the question of whether someone is affected by an institutional or structural 
framework.  
‘Representation’ is also important on a third level beyond ’ordinary-political 
misrepresentation’ and ‘misframing’. According to Fraser, ‘parity of participation’ requires 
the democratisation of the rules that determine the subjects of justice. If states or powerful 
transnational actors ‘monopolize the activity of frame-setting’ – i.e. if they alone are able to 
determine who counts as a subject of justice, people suffer from ‘meta-political 
misrepresentation’.78 To remedy such forms of injustice, Fraser recommends the creation of 
new global institutions that can produce binding rules as to the ‘who’ of social justice. But 
since the question of the ‘who’ concerns everybody and cannot be resolved as a mere 
‘technical matter’ she also argues for a second track that complements these institutions. This 
second track is the civil society which holds the above institutions accountable and allows 
people to participate in the frame-setting process by means of dialogical and inclusive 
political debates.79   
The principle of ‘parity of participation’ is the benchmark against which progress with regard 
to ‘redistribution’, ‘recognition’ and ‘representation’ is assessed. Fraser believes that only a 
combination of all three dimensions will eradicate most obstacles to social justice that can be 
found in modern societies. She thus declines to prioritise one dimension over the others, 
which in my opinion is a mistake, since only the removal of obstacles to ‘representation’ will 
enable people to fight against ‘first-order injustices’ of ‘maldistribution’ and ‘misrecognition’. 
The following graphic summarises Fraser’s approach and provides an overview for those not 
familiar with her terminology.   
 
                                                
77 Ibid., 65. 
78 Ibid., 26. 





2. Fraser and the Context of Work 
Picking up the threads of chapter two again, the thesis will now explain in some detail why 
Fraser’s theory of ‘participatory parity’ could lay the foundation for a strategy to re-embed the 
economy in society. Issues of work will again be the main focus of attention. 
Big economic corporations can exert huge influence on national policies through lobbying, 
political funding and the control of the media. Their interests coincide with a neo-liberal 
market agenda in general and a flexible labour regime in particular. Truly independent 
political parties that have the courage and imagination for radical change are rare and they 
lack the financial means to play a significant role. It is no coincidence then that workers in 
many countries have lost their faith in politics and democracy. They feel that their voices are 
not being heard and that their interests are not reflected in the political course of their 
governments. A strategy which seeks to counter this tendency would have to reinvigorate 
democratic structures by enhancing what Fraser calls ‘representation’.  
‘Representation’ for workers is also absent on a global level where arguably the most serious 
forms of injustice have their origin. International corporations, the financial markets, big 
investors and the neo-liberal governance structure itself are largely beyond scrutiny and 
control, although they have a huge impact on workers in different parts of the world. 
International corporations may serve as a first example to illustrate this point. Their activities 
are dispersed over various jurisdictions and yet the frame to press social justice claims against 
them is, as Fraser points out, the Keynesian-Westphalian nation-state. A worker who is 
subject to exploitative practices will face legal and practical obstacles to press charges against 
a responsible lead firm in a supply chain, if the latter is located in a foreign country. This 
worker thus suffers from a lack of ‘representation’.  
The problem is further aggravated if we consider the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs), the WTO or financial markets. The previous chapter has described the two former 
institutions as part of an ‘unholy alliance’ that was responsible for the removal of trade 
barriers and the integration of national economies into a global market. In the context of the 
IFIs, I have also briefly discussed the World Bank’s second generation reform agenda. I 
concluded that this agenda, despite a new rhetoric, continues to promote free markets as the 
key to development and economic growth. Discussions within the WTO about the integration 
of a social clause have also failed to produce any results and, just like the IFIs, this 
organization continues to be a powerful engine for free markets. The influence of these 
institutions on labour standards has been fatal. In a global economy, governments compete 
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with other countries and are under constant pressure to adjust their regulatory environments so 
as to sustain or attract investment. Business interests prevail while social, human, ecological 
or distributive aspects are rarely given sufficient attention. The impact of financial markets on 
the lives of workers has also been discussed in the previous chapter. Speculative activities 
produce insecurities for workers and society as a whole and are subject to only limited 
controls. We therefore have to ask if there are forums for workers to challenge institutions 
such as the IFIs, the WTO and the financial market.  
The ILO is the most likely candidate but its tripartite structure has not been adjusted to new 
patterns of work. The bodies that have access to the Governing Body (unions) are not 
representative of most workers in a globalizing economy. It is also highly questionable 
whether the ILO possesses the necessary means to challenge more powerful neo-liberal 
organizations and financial markets. Conventions are a blunt instrument for social change if 
they are not ratified by many countries and if the enforcement mechanism does not provide 
for concrete sanctions.80 The limitations of the ILO are discussed in more detail in chapter 
seven. 
An alternative answer to the problem of ‘representation’ may lie within the WTO and the IFIs 
themselves but I do not believe that this strategy offers the most promising way forward for 
those concerned with the interests of workers, since the neo-liberal agenda is part of their 
rationale - indeed their raison d’être. The WTO was set up to further global trade and has no 
authority and expertise in labour and social matters. Similarly, the IFIs are not supposed to 
consider social or distributive concerns in their lending decisions.81 Therefore, even if these 
institutions became more democratic they are unlikely to become guarantors of social and 
legal protection for workers.  
Habermas proposes a multi-level governance system under the auspices of a reformed United 
Nations (UN) to shield citizens from the pathologies of a global economy.82 However, the UN 
is a weak organization that has no adjudicative power on labour or social matter whatsoever. 
States would have to shift far-reaching regulatory competences to this organization, which 
seems like a utopian idea in the light of the current predominance of neo-liberal ideology.  
In the following chapter of this thesis I will argue that labour ‘representation’ on a domestic 
and global level can be enhanced in practice through New Governance models. If these 
                                                
80 The ILO can criticize non-compliance with conventions but only once (in a case against Burma) has it 
requested its member states to impose sanctions. 
81 Ibid., 236. 
82 Habermas 2006. 
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models are founded in a principle of participation they may offer an alternative path to the 
improvement of working conditions and worker protections which may, in the long run, even 
translate into formal institutions of adjudication. 
3. Fraser and Polanyi 
The examples of the previous section suggest that ‘representation’ needs to be the main 
feature of a counter hegemonic strategy against neo-liberal predominance. It is this aspect of 
Fraser’s framework that resonates most strongly with the three interpretations of 
disembeddedness presented in chapter two.  
First, ‘representation’ is a precondition for attaining any acceptable balance between 
economic and other concerns. As long as the voices of workers are marginalised on the 
domestic level through political parties that exclusively further business interests and through 
the unfettered power of financial markets and international organizations on the global level, 
it is unlikely that politics will give more deference to distributive, social and human concerns.  
Second, ‘representation’ is also necessary to regain grip and control over economic processes. 
Workers need a forum where they can challenge neo-liberal policies collectively. Unions or 
the ILO have provided such options in the past but they are not representative of most 
workers in a globalizing economy anymore. A counter hegemonic strategy therefore has to 
create new political spaces of contestation that include workers and that give voice to 
everybody else who is affected by neo-liberal policies.  
Third, ‘representation’ is a foundation upon which the influence of market forces on the 
individual could be reduced. Workers need a voice to leverage laws that protect those inside 
and outside labour markets (unemployment benefits, social welfare, disability support, 
adequate income, legal protection against unfair dismissal and social entitlements). Thus, only 
once ‘representation’ is sufficiently institutionalised will workers be able to press for ‘first-
order’ claims of ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ that are necessary to complete the transition 
from a disembedded economy to an economy once again re-embedded in society.  
Both Polanyi and Fraser understand the capitalist crisis as a multidimensional phenomenon.83 
Both acknowledge that if market forces are the only source of social ordering they will 
inevitably disrupt communities, destroy livelihoods and exploit natural resources. What 
Polanyi failed to see, however, is that protections designed to constrain markets could 
                                                
83 Fraser 2012, 5. 
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themselves produce and entrench new forms of injustice.84 This was the case in the post-war 
welfare states where women were subordinated to men, where several categories of workers 
were ignored and where social security was built on the back of developing countries.85 In 
other words, the post-war consensus disregarded key dimensions of Fraser’s theory of justice. 
If women do not receive equal protection and opportunities at work they are subject to 
‘misrecognition’. If former colonies are pushed into unequal relationships of exchange with 
developed countries and if categories of workers (such as casual, informal or contract 
workers) are ignored they suffer from a lack of ‘representation’ and ‘redistribution’ 
respectively.  We therefore have to acknowledge that regulations themselves can serve to 
protect some at the expense of others, in the sense that they create new impediments to ‘parity 
of participation’. Fraser’s framework urges us to stay alert and to ask critically at any time: 
Does the social arrangement in question work to ensure ‘redistribution’, ‘recognition’, and 
‘representation’ so as to further ‘parity of participation’?  
Having established the theoretical basis for a counter hegemonic strategy to neo-liberal 
hegemony, the next step requires us to ask how we can integrate this concept on the political 
stage so that Fraser’s theoretical insights are translated into concrete policies. New 
Governance models offer alternative mechanisms of law-making that do not rely exclusively 
on the political will and the capacity of states and international organizations. These models 
are particularly relevant to this project because they focus primarily on private stakeholders 
and are thus predestined to fulfil the criterion of ‘representation’. 
4. New Governance: Introduction 
Law has already appeared, albeit tacitly, at crucial places in this thesis. What Polanyi had in 
mind when he wrote about making markets subject to non-economic control were legal 
institutions designed to prevent land, labour and money from becoming commodified. The 
post-war welfare states did exactly that by establishing labour protections, collective 
bargaining rules and numerous public law institutions to curb international trade. The neo-
liberal era was highly dependent on law as a policy instrument as well: The elimination of 
trade barriers, the development of financial regimes, the protection of property and contract 
                                                
84 Ibid and Fraser 2013. Fraser criticises Polanyi for two further shortcomings: She contends that Polanyi ignores 
the positive emancipatory effects of markets and that his conceptual dualism of economic liberalism vs. social 
protection forecloses the possibility of analysing struggles that do not align with either of the two sides. These 
are valid concerns. However, given that the main features of the current crisis are a result of the predominance of 
market ordering, Polanyi’s framework is still useful for progressive thinkers today.   
85 Ibid. 
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rights and much more required far-reaching legislative changes.86 Turning to Fraser and her 
concept of ‘parity of participation’, there can be no doubt that law is an integral and 
indispensable element of her call to create ‘social arrangements’ that enable people to 
‘interact with one another as peers’.87 
The common thread that runs through these different narratives is the idea of law as an 
instrument of social change. Legal rules do not only structure human behaviour and 
expectations, but also distribute authority and resources in fundamental ways. The dangerous 
flipside, of course, is when people make us believe that legal rules are a neutral or mere 
technical matter. In these cases the political choices (pertaining to ‘redistribution’, 
‘recognition’ and ‘representation’) always inherent in legal rules, are masked.  
However appealing law may appear to progressive thinkers in different academic fields, one 
must resist the temptation of blind legal optimism. There are often striking differences 
between the law in books and the law in action on the one hand, and the capabilities of people 
to use the law to their advantage on the other.88 Moreover, even those rules that appear most 
formal are subject to judicial discretion. And finally, legal rules stand in a relation of mutual 
influence with other, often informal, rules and the consequences of that interplay are often 
impossible to predict. 
Those concerns aside, law can be a powerful instrument of social change, in particular if it is 
used democratically to include a wide range of different stakeholders.89 A new and innovative 
approach in legal thought and practice that seems to gravitate in this direction is referred to as 
New Governance or New Governance scholarship. These two phrases have in recent years 
established a recognised denotation90 and stand for a growing and heterogeneous legal field 
that challenges the way in which law is commonly understood and conceptualised. New 
Governance scholars advocate collaborative, bottom-up, flexible and dynamic modes of 
regulation as opposed to state-centred, command-style, fixed-rule regulation.  
                                                
86 Deregulation, a term often used to describe the regulatory development of the neo-liberal period, is 
misleading. A more accurate term would be re-regulation. See Kennedy 2006 for a more detailed analysis.  
87 Fraser 2010, 365. 
88 Developing countries in particular suffer from a lack of regulatory capacities (both in terms of enforcement 
and rule generation). The second thought is intended to capture two different dilemmas: First, there is the 
possibility that people do not have the financial means and the information necessary to claim their rights (a 
problem that can arguably be found in developed and developing countries in equal measure) and second there is 
also a chance that more powerful actors are able to influence decisions in their favour. 
89 Critical legal scholars have long rejected law as a vehicle for social change. This has changed with the arrival 
of second-generation feminist, race and gay theorists, Lobel 2004, 448. 
90 Karkkainen 2004, 472. 
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The origin and development of New Governance is best understood as part of a broader shift 
in legal reasoning triggered by new experiences of complexity and volatility in modern 
societies on the one hand, and the inadequacy of existing legal theories in achieving social, 
political, ecological or economic ends on the other hand.91 The emergence of various New 
Governance techniques in practice, however, has often been a result of political conflict 
between civil society, NGOs, corporations and the state.92 
New Governance is a broad legal movement that has not yet settled (and likely never will) 
upon a shared understanding of what forms and what does not form part of its own discipline. 
Most scholars who consider themselves a member of this movement would, however, 
distinguish their own approach from ‘systems theory’, a related governance school that is 
usually associated with the work of Gunther Teubner.93 For Teubner, substantive law 
constitutes a self-referential, autonomous and normatively closed system which is unable to 
regulate other subsystems with similar characteristics.94 Any attempt to do so inevitably 
results in a ‘regulatory trilemma’ where law turns out to be either irrelevant, destructive of the 
regulated subsystem or self-distorted in relation to it.95 The solution for Teubner and his 
followers are ‘reflexive’ legal mechanisms that aim to influence the self-regulating processes 
of these subsystems without however interfering with them.96 Many New Governance 
scholars do not share Teubners diagnosis of legal systems, nor do they embrace reflexive 
theories as a whole. Certain aspects of ‘systems theory’, however, have entered the writings of 
different New Governance scholars.  
Another school of legal thought that has sometimes been distinguished from New Governance 
relates to John Braithwaite’s body of work about ‘responsive regulation’.97 Many of the ideas 
developed at greater length in the next chapter are akin to the basic assumptions of his 
writings (in particular a preference for deliberative practices) but differences to other New 
Governance scholars are not so serious as to warrant a separate consideration. 
 
 
                                                
91 In an increasingly complex and volatile world, New Governance contends that legal institutions themselves 
need to be varied, diverse and revisable, see Lobel 2004, 355ff (distinguishing between internal and external 
triggers). 
92 Kolben 2011, 59. 
93 Teubner 1983,1987 and 1997. 
94 Teubner 1997, 764. 
95 Teubner 1987, 21. 
96 Teubner 1983, 274.The classic example is collective bargaining law which regulates the self-regulating 
activities of various actors. 
97 Ayres and Braithwaite 1992. 
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5. Principles of New Governance and Practical Examples 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to flesh out all the fine distinctions and competing ideas 
that exist between various New Governance scholars. The field has in recent years become so 
large and complex that even those who have been involved since the beginning struggle to 
keep track of all its new developments. I therefore focus on a set of recurring principles – a 
summary of features that build a more or less stable repertoire of (and a loose link between) 
different New Governance scholars. The following four features stand out to me as the most 
defining phenomena: 
• Decentralisation 
• Collaboration and Participation 
• Soft Law 
• Diversity and Adaptability 
New Governance techniques shift regulatory responsibilities from the state to private actors 
such as firms, NGOs and civil society. These entities do not only decide how policy goals are 
to be carried out, they also contribute proactively in the search for appropriate regulatory 
objectives in the first place.98 However, although there are proponents who advocate purely 
private regulatory solutions, most New Governance scholars retain a significant array of 
functions for the state, including the improvement of private stakeholder capacities; the 
facilitation and steering of private collaborations; the provision of incentives to abide by 
norms; the creation of minimum standards and default rules; and the replication of successful 
approaches.99  
New Governance views states, civil society groups and NGOs as partners in the pursuit of 
regulatory ends. It is a collaborative model which stimulates dialogue and requires 
stakeholders with completely divergent agendas to work together in order to realize their 
interests. The synergies that emerge from such partnerships are said to result in more effective 
and context-sensitive outcomes.  
Some New Governance scholars advocate bottom-up approaches with broad-scale 
involvement of citizens in decision-making processes.100 The merits of participation are 
fundamental to this thesis: Direct participation enhances the democratic ideal of people’s 
                                                
98 Abott and Snidal 2009, 529.  
99 Ibid., 521ff. 
100 Leading intellectual figures are John Baithwaite and Charles Sable. See, inter alia, Cohen and Sabel 1997, 
Ayres and Braithwaite 1992. 
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active involvement in political life101, mitigates advancements of self-interest102, increases 
legitimacy of legal rules and empowers those who are most disadvantaged in society.103  
Conventional forms of regulation are often rendered meaningless in cases where the problems 
prove complex, disagreements intense and the capacities of the state inadequate.104 New 
Governance has therefore incorporated more ‘voluntary’ rules and principles into their 
models. Whereas hard law is compulsory, often precise and enforced by formal legal 
procedures, soft law uses more flexible, less clear-cut prescriptions such as standards, 
guidelines and benchmarks.105 Sometimes, New Governance techniques simply mandate the 
disclosure of information, the provision of reports, or even less intrusive, encourage 
participants to enter into dialogues.106 For their enforcement, private schemes rely on potential 
commercial benefits (relief of inspections or sanctions, permission to use eco-labels etc), 
pressure from consumers, trade unions, NGOs or the media and the implicit threat of the state 
or background rules to intervene when soft law measures fail.107  
Another characteristic of New Governance is its rejection of one-size-fits-all approaches. 
Regulatory issues are addressed in diverse ways through different methodologies and 
practices such as information sharing, networking and creative combinations of formal and 
informal rules. This allows New Governance not only to respond to extreme complexity and 
factual uncertainty but also to adapt pragmatically to new information and changing 
circumstances. Contrary to conventional rules, which are generated and revised through 
painstakingly slow and cumbersome legislative processes, private schemes are understood to 
be quickly produced and altered in the light of new realities. Private schemes also compete 
with and learn from other regulatory experiments, thereby fostering a culture of permanent 
intervention, ongoing evaluation, constant improvement and dynamic learning. In a sense 
                                                
101 Countries and international organizations typically rely on elections as the principal means for realizing their 
democratic commitments. Elections are important instruments to ensure a degree of accountability and 
responsiveness from governments, but they are seldom truly empowering for the common people. Those who are 
allowed to vote do not, under normal circumstances, make policies themselves. They are passive recipients of 
political agendas with only limited control or influence.  
102 During participatory processes people may experience a change in their relationships to others and society in 
general. Most tellingly, they may develop a new understanding of their significance as a member of the polity 
and be encouraged to revoke their personal interests in support of a greater good, Steiner 1988, 105. 
103 Broad political participation opens up avenues for change which is of special importance to marginalised 
individuals whose voices are regularly ignored by more powerful decision-makers. 
104 Lobel 2004, 393f. 
105 However, the idea that hard law is more easily enforced and likely to bring about the social changes aspired to 
has already been challenged at the beginning of this section. See also Trubek and Trubek 2005, 355ff  
106 Abott and Snidal 2009, 530f. 
107 Ibid., 543. Soft law only seldom stands alone in complete isolation from mandatory rules. Trubek and Trubek 
2007 discuss three ways in which New Governance and conventional law can relate to each other: 
Complementarity, rivalry and transformation. 
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then, Lobel was right when she contended some years ago that ‘newness itself becomes the 
substance of the emerging paradigm.’108  
New Governance ideas have been applied in practice in many policy areas. In the domestic 
sphere, for instance, they have informed new initiatives against hidden and intricate forms of 
discrimination. Civil rights are a weak instrument for redressing discriminatory practices that 
are not the result of someone’s visible actions but rather the cumulative product of ‘… 
corporate culture, informal norms, networking, training, mentoring, and evaluation.’109 A 
work environment can become intimidating or unpleasant notwithstanding any identifiable 
illegal conduct. Many employers have therefore turned to alternative strategies for relief that 
contain some of the typical New Governance features. Instead of adversarial legalism, they 
introduce advisors from outside (decentralisation) to engage with workers (participation, 
collaboration) in continuous dialogue (adaptability and learning).110 Some firms have 
systematically begun to gather information about discrimination and to share it with other 
firms.111 Others again have embraced ethical codes (flexible rules) and training programs.112 
New Governance features have also infiltrated approaches to problem solving in the 
international realm. The most prominent examples are codes of conduct which aim to raise 
labour standards throughout global supply chains.113 Big lead firms are pressured by 
consumers, unions, student activists and NGOs to adopt codes and ensure compliance to 
labour standards reflected in them by firms further down the chain of production.114 Some 
firms have voluntarily endorsed these codes to gain more control over suppliers or to increase 
employees’ productivity.115 Codes of conduct are either produced by companies themselves or 
in partnership with trade unions and NGOs (collaboration).116 However, workers have not 
regularly been invited to negotiations (no broad participation). Sceptics criticise inadequate 
monitoring (assessments are often conducted by the firm itself and only seldom involve an 
independent third party) and weak enforcement mechanisms (compliance depends on 
                                                
108 Lobel 2004, 354. 
109 Ibid., 420. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Without default or background rules ethical codes have usually not been very effective, ibid., 422. 
113 Some scholars hope that the positive effects of such codes will also ‘spill over’ into domestic firms where 
working conditions are even worse, Hepple 1999, 350. Other issues that may be found in such codes concern the 
environment, social provisions, development, business practices and the rule of law, ibid, 357. 
114 Critics warn that the focus on well known companies such as Nike, Nestle and Disney enables many less 
familiar manufacturers and retailers in their shadow to operate under competitive advantages (‘free rider 
problem’), Gereffi and Mayer 2004, 22. 
115 Hepple, 1999, 355. 
116 There are codes that emanate from state initiatives but private schemes or private-public hybrids are far more 
common (decentralisation). 
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consumer pressure or potential benefits).117 The fact that many codes impose only low 
standards and use very broad conceptual descriptions exacerbates their voluntary nature (soft 
law).  
This chapter has provided an overview of Nancy Fraser’s theory of justice and New 
Governance. ‘Parity of participation’ is a concept which offers considerable potential for 
addressing various forms of injustice in a globalizing world. New Governance also responds 
to globalization, albeit in a different sense. This broad strand of legal thought and practice 
challenges conventional assumptions about law and, in so doing, clears the path for new and 
innovative ways of using legal techniques as a vehicle for social change. How these two 
bodies of work may benefit from each other and how their strengths can be combined in a 
































                                                
117 Codes of conduct seldom include consequences of non-adherence such as ‘corrective action[s]’ or 
‘termination of contract or business relationship[s]’, Hepple 1999, 360.  
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IV. A COMBINED APPROACH TO COUNTER NEO-LIBERAL HEGEMONY 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight particular omissions of New Governance 
scholarship and Fraser’s theory of justice and to explain how these shortcomings could be 
partly resolved if the two concepts were combined. However, an integration of Fraser’s theory 
into New Governance models is not a simple task but would require New Governance 
scholars to refocus their attention on participation and to assign more importance to forms of 
injustice that overflow national borders.  
1. The Omissions of New Governance Scholarship 
It is a widely held assumption in the New Governance community that their models are 
normatively open and thus, in principle, receptive to all parties of the political spectrum:118  
‘The premise of the governance model is that, in order for a legal regime to be 
sustainable, it must encompass a multitude of values and account for conflict and 
compromise. It must acknowledge the diversity and changing interests of many 
stakeholders. It must recognize the legitimacy of private economic interests while 
appealing to public values. … [T]he obsessive maintenance of traditional 
boundaries – including those of public and private, profit and nonprofit, formal 
and informal, theory and practice, secular and religious, left and right – is no 
longer a major concern. … On the contrary, the governance model aims to move 
beyond these pervasive dichotomies in search of sustainable structures. Its 
objective is not to police boundaries, but rather to seek out and open structures 
that will facilitate wider imaginative horizons.’119 
New Governance’s promise to accommodate various political interests from the left to the 
right hinges on the ability of people with different agendas and endowments to engage in 
decision-making processes on equal terms. However, case studies in the domestic sphere give 
a highly unsatisfying account of how participatory methods have been applied in concrete 
settings.120 The bottom line of a recent survey conducted by Abott and Snidal on New 
Governance in the international realm is equally disappointing:  
‘Even from a less purist perspective, the quality of participation and deliberation 
in Transnational New Governance remains uneven. Firm schemes are limited to 
economic stakeholders and are not highly deliberative, although a few schemes do 
incorporate significant input from other groups. Other schemes vary widely in 
                                                
118 Burca 2010 uses the phrase ‘normatively empty’, ibid., 237. See also Cohen 2010 (indicating a normative 
‘suspension of distributive ends’ by New Governance scholars), ibid., 382. 
119 Lobel 2004, 379f and 442. 
120 For an early example see Anderson and Yaffee 1998 (concluding that HCPs which allow for exemptions of 
the US Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on the taking of fish and wildlife species have fallen short of the 
participatory ideal that their architects had in mind). See also Alexander 2009 (describing the failure of the 
public housing reform in Chicago to provide for effective participation of residents) and Bach 2010 (indicating 
‘an absence of substantive participation by poor communities in goal-setting and program design …’ with regard 
to the welfare reform in the US), ibid., 239.  
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engaging those ultimately affected by regulatory decisions, such as developing 
country workers, rather than elite groups that claim to speak for them.’  
The implications of these findings should not be underestimated. A great deal of New 
Governance’s legitimacy derives from the underlying assumption that it includes those who 
are directly affected by policy outcomes in the process of creating them. It would be too easy 
to ascribe participatory shortcomings to contingent circumstances of particular local settings, 
temporary difficulties of technical adjustment or inadequate understanding of New 
Governance theory by practitioners. The exposed problems signal two deeper omissions of 
New Governance scholarship that will, sooner or later, come to bear on the credibility of the 
whole movement if they are not addressed: First, New Governance scholarship tends to 
sacrifice meaningful and broad participation for pragmatism and flexibility. Second, New 
Governance lacks an analysis of political economy and a robust theory to redress unequal 
cultural standing.  
One would be hard pressed to find a single New Governance scholar who does not accentuate 
participation in one way or the other but only few give it the attention it deserves. The reason 
can partly be found in a systemic contradiction between two of the organizing principles of 
New Governance: The need for pragmatic solutions and quick revisions stand in sharp 
contrast to the often slow processes of participation. It is no coincidence then that critics see 
New Governance as a ‘… covert form of deregulation designed to mask reduction of 
environmental standards and social protection.’121 The call for flexibility in process design 
may well translate into flexibility of the kind found in labour markets if those affected by 
policies do not receive a fair chance to participate. Fraser’s theory of justice requires 
‘representation’ for all those who are subject to a given governance structure. Her concept 
urges New Governance scholars to place participation at the centre of their attention. 
New Governance scholarship also fails to address power asymmetries which impede full and 
equal participation in political debates. Capital is highly organized and has the financial 
resources to influence and determine the content and the terms of discussions that are taking 
place. Its power is not restricted to traditional decision-making processes within governments 
or international organizations but may well extend to new Governance techniques as well. If 
New Governance scholars advocate forms of participation without addressing power 
imbalances that root in economic structures, their techniques will, when applied in practice, 
always run the risk of being undermined by those with superior financial means. A preceding 
minimum commitment to redistribution therefore will be necessary for all stakeholders to 
                                                
121 Trubek and Trubek 2007. 
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participate and to have a fair chance in challenging more powerful actors on highly uneven 
political grounds.122  
In a similar vein, New Governance scholarship has showed an insufficient interest in 
inequalities of cultural status despite its overwhelming impact on the ability of people to 
bargain with each other as peers. Barriers to participation can be embedded in racial, gender, 
religious or other hierarchies. Lisa Alexander’s description of the Chicago public housing 
reform, for instance, illustrates how racial and gender disparities impinge on people’s ability 
to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes that impact their lives.123  
Fraser’s theory of justice gives due consideration to both ‘economic redistribution’ and 
‘cultural recognition’ and may therefore complement New Governance in important and 
necessary ways. The problem is not, as many commentators seem to suggest, New 
Governance’s promise to be open to all ideological stripes itself, but rather that – to borrow a 
Kantian phrase – the conditions of possibility for this promise are not fulfilled. New 
Governance could be an attractive field for progressive thinkers because it has the potential to 
tilt the political status quo in favour of those who are currently disadvantaged, but only if 
three preconditions for equal participation are established: There must not be any restriction 
on subject matter, the terms of bargaining must allow for any and all possible outcomes and 
all those potentially affected by decisions must be fully included in the participatory process.  
2. The Omissions of Fraser 
Since the times of Plato and Aristotle, there have always been thinkers that envisioned 
expanded, large-scale solutions to societal problems. Clarifying the nature and roots of 
predicaments, assessing the potential for escape and elaborating alternative paths, these 
theorists and philosophers have sharpened our eye to various ills and have given us many 
valuable insights into the human condition and the requirements to coexist. Each concept, 
however, has been embedded in a certain time characterized by its own questions and its own 
unique set of problems. For reasons given above, Fraser’s theory of justice is, at least to me, 
the most promising concept at the current conjuncture.  
Theories of justice have always been a somewhat double-edged sword. Their greatest 
strengths have often also been their greatest weakness. Ambitious narratives with a high level 
of abstraction and comprehensiveness may be short on practical solutions and concrete 
                                                
122 The particular redistributive interventions that I consider necessary are discussed in the next chapter.  
123 Alexander 2009. 
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instructions. The most elegant descriptions, the clearest and most explanatory images and the 
most powerful ideas are not helpful if there is no way to put them into practice.  
Fraser’s work derives inspiration from current social struggles including feminism, anti-
imperialism, environmentalism and anti-globalization which is a reason why her theory is 
more grounded in realities than many other philosophical accounts. However, there are still 
many unanswered questions. For instance: How are Fraser’s two tracks (institutions and civil 
society) to be realized in practice and what role should the state play in this endeavour vis-à-
vis the civil society? Moreover, how will law figure in the task of realizing parity of 
participation – in particular, what kind of rules are required and how should they be 
produced?  
New Governance may provide some answers to these questions. Most scholars in this field of 
research have recognised the importance of the state as a power that looms in the background 
to step in when New Governance fails. They advocate collaborative models which include the 
state, economic stakeholders and civil society groups. In these concepts, information flows 
back and forth, from state to private entities and in the opposite direction, thereby influencing 
and questioning the ideas that prevail and ultimately the very structure of these institutions. 
Operating within such a framework, struggles usually assume the form of normal ‘first-order’ 
claims of ‘redistribution’, ‘recognition’ and ‘ordinary-political representation’, but over time 
and due to pressure exerted by progressive groups, these forums could transform into places 
for the contestation of ‘meta-political misrepresentation’. Struggles would be dispersed into 
many different arenas. Other than Fraser’s two tracks, there would be just systems of a kind 
that cater to civil society, private entities and also to the state as an important player. If we 
expand this thought-provoking concept even further we might think of ways in which these 
dispersed efforts could start to network, become more inclusive and grow to the point where 
they are powerful enough to influence the creation of formal institutions with real power of 
adjudication.124  Networking is a salient feature of many New Governance models and is 
particularly widespread among ‘democratic experimentalists’:  
‘What is required instead, democratic experimentalists argue, is a centrally coordinated 
and monitored system of parallel local experiments, networked and disciplined through 
structured information disclosures and monitoring requirements, subject to rolling 
                                                
124 Of course, the situation becomes more difficult if one wishes to regulate international spheres. New 
Governance would have to incorporate the governments of various countries. This could happen incrementally in 
the sense that one New Governance experiment in one country would spur other similar experiments in other 
countries and so on. These models could also start off as purely private schemes and draw in states over time as 
they increase public acceptance and become more influential. 
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minimum performance benchmarks but otherwise free to experiment in a continuous and 
ceaseless effort to improve, learn, and revise.’125 
 Admittedly, the idea I am proposing here is quite abstract and warrants further exploration. 
The crucial point I want to stress is simply that given the resistance one has to expect from 
organised capital, the creation of formal institutions is more likely to emerge from practical 
governance experiments over time than from scratch.  
To be sure, New Governance models will not bring about significant change without political 
struggle. Powerful economic stakeholders are unwilling to participate in New Governance 
models that do not suit their interests. The successful functioning of these models thus 
depends on legal background rules that come into effect when economic stakeholders fail to 
engage in such processes or when engagement does not lead to results. On their own terms, 
however, states are unlikely to provide such rules, which is why political campaigns aimed at 
bringing various issues to policy tables are so essential. There are some purely private 
schemes (codes of conduct) that have effectively strengthened the rights and protections of 
workers without involving the state but these endeavours have been the exception and they 
have also relied on some kind of political mobilization (in the form of substantial consumer 
pressures that forces big corporations to implement and comply with certain standards).126  
With regard to the nature of rules required for ‘parity of participation’ and the process of their 
creation, New Governance may be of further service to Fraser’s theory. In combination with 
harder background rules, soft law mechanisms may clear the path for new and creative 
solutions to old regulatory dilemmas. In situations of intense disagreements and overflowing 
complexity, soft law measures can be an interesting option, especially if they are considered 
an interim result in lieu of consecutive negotiations. The potential of soft law and alternative 
forms of enforcement has not yet been explored exhaustively but they offer new and exciting 
ways of thinking about law and the ways it could be used for various ends. 
With reference to Fraser’s manifest predilection for deliberative processes, New Governance 
may offer the concrete tools to move beyond elections as the conventional mechanism for 
political representation. If New Governance scholars place participation at the centre of their 
approaches, a liaison between this school of legal thought and Fraser’s theory of justice could 
be a powerful engine for a rich democratic culture.     
 
                                                
125 Karkkainen 2004, 485. 
126 For further discussion of the importance of political struggle see chapter five and the conclusion of this thesis.  
 34 
3. Integration through Participation 
At risk of pedantry, let me begin with some hair-splitting over definitions. The concept I am 
proposing here integrates Fraser’s theory into New Governance and not, vice versa, (New 
Governance into Fraser’s theory). To reiterate, the main target audience of my thesis is 
progressive lawyers in the field of New Governance. I do not seek to alter or improve on 
Fraser’s framework which is perfect as it stands in its openness. There are, of course, as we 
have seen, issues that would make it worthwhile for Fraser to engage with New Governance 
scholarship, but any attempt to tie her concept to this school of law will have the irrevocable 
effect of a straightjacket and may foreclose alternative modes of application. This is not my 
intention. I will also refrain from using the term merger which has business overtones and 
suggests the transformation of something lesser into something greater through the death of 
the former individual parts.  
The phrase then that I would like to employ as a description of my endeavour is ‘Integration 
through participation’. Let me explain: Fraser’s concept of ‘parity of participation’ has a 
procedural and a substantive component:  
On the one hand, the principle of participatory parity is an outcome notion, which 
specifies a substantive principle of justice by which we may evaluate social 
arrangements: the latter are just if and only if they permit all the relevant social 
actors to participate as peers in social life. On the other hand, participatory parity 
is also a process notion, which specifies a procedural standard by which we may 
evaluate the democratic legitimacy of norms: the latter are legitimate if and only 
if they can command the assent of all concerned in fair and open processes of 
deliberation, in which all can participate as peers.’127 
 For the purposes of this thesis, I will only focus on the second aspect of ‘parity of 
participation’ (hence ‘Integration through participation’). It is my belief that if the criteria for 
fair and equal participation are given128, outcomes will, over time, also come to fulfil the 
substantive requirements of ‘parity of participation’. This may sound disappointing or even 
heretical in times where large-scale redistributive proposals have become almost axiomatic 
among contemporary left-wing intellectuals. However, there are no routes to justify such 
measures within the New Governance framework other than for the reason to make 
participation work. By all means, one must not underestimate the scale of redistribution 
necessary to fulfil the preconditions of fair and equal participation; neither must one 
underestimate the capacities of collaborative New Governance models to trigger legal and 
institutional reform. The next chapter will provide a more detailed analysis of these 
                                                
127 Fraser 2009, 28f. 
128 See section one of this chapter. 
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correlations. For the moment, I am simply charting the ideas for an integrative model along 
general lines. 
The focus on the procedural aspect of ‘parity of participation’ has another advantage. It is less 
intrusive and thus less paternalistic than direct attempts to establish the substantive aspect.129 
Paternalism, although ubiquitous in every legal system, is problematic because it denies an 
individual the status of an autonomous person capable of setting his/her own goals.130 
However, only anarchists who seek to abolish any form of coercion would seriously doubt the 
legitimacy of paternalist actions in general. If we argue that redistribution and recognition 
must be pursued only insofar as it is necessary for people to engage in decision-making 
processes on equal terms we can reduce paternalism to a minimum amount. In general, the 
closer value judgments come to reflect a consensus in society, the less paternalistic they are. 
Seeing the impossibility of perfect consensus for most political questions, the next best option 
in my opinion are decisions based on full and equal participation which is exactly what 
Fraser’s procedural principle of ‘parity of participation’ iterates. 
Realizing the procedural component of Fraser’s theory will require New Governance scholars 
to place participation at the centre of their approaches. Indeed, they will have to make it their 
main organizing principle. This will, at least to some degree, necessitate a retreat from 
flexibility and adaptability, two principles which often anyway stem from pressures to imitate 
the market. Participation, despite all the modern advances in information technology, is a 
slow and cumbersome process that requires prolonged efforts and cultivation.  
Crucially, New Governance will have to move from the domestic to the international sphere. 
Fraser teaches us that ‘social processes shaping … [peoples] lives routinely overflow 
territorial borders. … [D]ecision taken in one territorial state often impact the lives of those 
outside it, as do the actions of transnational corporations, international currency speculators, 
and large institutional investors.’131 New Governance models are unfortunately still 
predominantly applied in the national context of developed countries.132 Instead of seeking to 
increase the overlap between those potentially affected by policies and those entitled to 
protection (Fraser’s ‘all-subjected principle’), this state of affairs drives an even wider wedge 
                                                
129 Dworkin 1972 defines paternalism as follows: ‘By paternalism I shall understand roughly the interference 
with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, 
interests or values of the person coerced’, ibid., 20. Thus, two elements need to be present for paternalist action: 
Someone has to a) act for someone else’s benefit and b) go ahead even if the other person does not consent, 
Eidenmüller 2005, 359.  
130 Ibid., 366. 
131 Fraser 2009, 13. 
132 Abott and Snidal 2009, 509. 
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between the two groups. New Governance scholars will therefore need to push in two 
directions: Towards the inclusion of developing countries and across the boundaries of nation 
states. The collaborative New Governance model is potentially open to more than just one 
state, a fact that could, for instance, be used to hold transnational corporations operating in 
two or three countries accountable.  
Admittedly, the situation gets trickier when more states are involved or when a public power 
to issue legally binding background or default rules is not readily available which is the case 
with the governance structure of the global economy. Fraser argues that the modern territorial 
state has lost ‘… the administrative ability to steer “its” economy … and provide for the 
security and the well-being of “its” citizens ….’133 This leads her to argue for new formal 
transnational institutions that can translate discursively formed public opinions into binding 
rules and administrative action.134 Although Fraser’s proposal might finally be the right move, 
her analysis nevertheless conceals that the global economy is, after all, not a free floating 
construct, but a system rooted in a legal framework created by the states themselves. In the 
previous chapter I have briefly discussed the potential of some forums (ILO, WTO, IFIs, UN) 
to challenge and press for regulatory changes. From a New Governance perspective there 
have, moreover, been successful examples of purely private regulations in the international 
realm (codes of conduct) notwithstanding obstacles to enforcement.135 I have also indicated, 
in broad terms, a way how New Governance models might amplify their influence through 
networks and how this could, in the long run, lead to formal institutions with considerable 
countervailing power.  
One should also not lose sight of a new form of governance that is making itself increasingly 
felt in the international arena: ‘Transgovernmental regulatory networks’.136 These networks 
have sometimes been described as ‘subunits of national governments’ but many have 
developed spontaneously outside formal arrangements from a ‘need to work together to 
address common problems.’137 A leading example in the field of financial regulation is the 
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision which exerts enormous influence in the regulation 
of banking markets. Progressive labour lawyers, unions, NGOs and other civil society groups 
that fight for the interests of workers should try to break into this and other largely self-
regulating ‘transnational regulatory networks’ to pry them open to non-economic 
                                                
133 Fraser 2009, 98. 
134 Ibid., 97. 
135 Keller 2008 describes improvements for factory workers in El Salvador, Honduras, and Vietnam, ibid., 58. 
136 See Slaughter 2001. A related field that might spur the interest of New Governance scholars is the global 
administrative law project, see Cassese 2005. 
137 Ibid., 1 and 355.  
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stakeholders. Some prolonged efforts may even result in the infiltration of something 
resembling an ‘all-subjected principle’. We will need such drastic and creative approaches to 
curb the financial markets with its far-reaching impacts on people’s lives. 
To sum up, this chapter has outlined how New Governance and Fraser’s theory of justice are 
to benefit from each other and how the latter could be integrated into the former for a 
progressive legal strategy that is based on participation. The following chapter will analyse 
obstacles to fair and equal participation and ask whether the expectations typically associated 
with deliberative processes – fragmentation of power, transformation of relationships, 
fostering of shared interests and production of fair outcomes – can realistically be upheld. It 
is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to provide detailed answers to all the problems 
which may or may not emerge during the course of participatory processes. The following 
analysis should therefore be understood as a roadmap which indicates where problems may 
arise, how serious they could become and in which direction one might move to effectively 






























V. MAKING PARTICIPATION WORK 
The leitmotif that will run through this chapter concerns the ways in which power 
relationships influence the success of participation on various interpersonal and structural 
levels. Section one will provide an introduction to the discussion on power by presenting 
theories of Steven Lukes and John Gaventa. Sections two to four are subdivided along the 
lines of ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘what’ with regard to participation.138 These sections will apply the 
power-lens to the three preconditions for fair and equal participation established in the 
previous chapter: All those potentially affected by decisions must be fully included in the 
participatory process (‘who’), the terms of bargaining must allow for any and all possible 
outcomes (‘how’) and there must not exist any restriction on subject matter (‘what’).  
1. A Multi-Faceted Concept of Power 
Steven Lukes and John Gaventa have made important contributions to the debate on power. 
Lukes has expanded conventional theories of power that had focused exclusively on 
individual behaviour. He understands power as a structural phenomenon which is embedded 
in various societal arrangements and institutions. In his seminal book ‘Power: A Radical 
View’139 he insightfully distinguishes between ‘visible power’, ‘invisible power’ and ‘hidden 
power’. 
Visible power is what most people would associate with power. Individuals or groups who 
possess it can influence and control decisions or the interests of others when a conflict 
arises.140 But visible power is also manifest in legal rules, structures and processes that shape 
the interactions of human beings in societies. 
Hidden power concerns the capacity of some to set political agendas. People who are in 
possession of this form of power consciously or unconsciously determine which issues reach 
the policy table and who gets to the table. Patterns of hidden power are entrenched in ‘… 
values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (“rules of the game”) …’ that serve some 
people to further their interests at the expense of others.141 The self-regulating market with its 
emphasis on individuals is an instructive example. Not only does it exclude non-economic 
concerns and stakeholders from debates but it also favours individual over collective action.142    
                                                
138 Similar to Fraser’s ’who’, ’how’ and ‘what’ of justice. 
139 Lukes 1974. 
140 Ibid., 12. 
141 Bachrach and Baratz, quoted in ibid., 17. 
142 The expansion of private bargaining in work relations is a typical manifestation of this normative bias. 
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Invisible power refers to norms which have entered the consciousness of people through the 
control of information, culture and processes of socialisation. This form of power influences 
the thoughts and desires of people and determines what is normal, acceptable and possible. 
People living under desperate circumstances may come to accept their situation because 
alternatives or solutions are blocked from their consciousness. This power thus serves as a 
potent weapon to entrench certain ideas while banning others. Workers in the informal 
economy, for instance, often do not see how they could receive social and legal protections or 
they are not even aware that they might deserve them in the first place. 
Gaventa has elaborated further distinctions to Lukes’ classification. He argues that Lukes’ 
forms of power stand in direct correlation to certain spaces of engagement. Spaces are widely 
defined as ‘… opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially 
affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and interests.’143 
They are either ‘closed’ (e.g. when elites make decisions without consulting civil society), 
‘invited’ (e.g. when stakeholders are allowed to join a policy table) or ‘claimed’/‘created’ 
(e.g. when stakeholders demand that spaces be more inclusive or when people come together 
to create their own spaces).144 Gaventa also acknowledges that power struggles take place on 
different levels (local, national, global and many in between).145 Whereas some reformers 
tackle power imbalances which take place on village level or even in the intimate place of the 
household, others focus their energy on contesting national or international powers. 
Forms, spaces and levels of power stand in a relation of close entwinement and reciprocal 
influence.146 Power is thus not static, as many people seem to assume, but changes all the 
time. Gaventa also rejects rigid demarcations between those who have power and those who 
do not have it. Drawing on an insight of Foucault he claims that ‘… everyone posseses and is 
affected by power …’ in multiple, dynamic and complex ways.147 A crucial element of 
transformative strategies must therefore be to make people aware of their inherent potentials 
and opportunities.  
A real shift in power, according to Gaventa, takes place ‘… when social movements or social 
actors are able to work effectively across each of the dimensions [forms, spaces, levels] 
simultaneously … .’148 This requires progressive strategies to develop horizontal links 
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146 Ibid., 30. 
147 Ibid., 23. 
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between different organisations and stakeholders and vertical links across local, national and 
global levels.  
Another useful typology of power distinguishes between ‘power to’, ‘power over’, ‘power 
within’ and ‘power with’. Whereas ‘power to’ concerns the ability to act, make choices and 
exercise agency, ‘power over’ alludes to forms of domination and the ability of some actors to 
influence the thoughts and actions of others. ‘Power within’ strongly resonates with Lukes’ 
‘invisible power’. It concerns the capacity of people to imagine alternative realities, raise new 
questions and challenge old paradigms. The concept of ‘power with’, eventually, refers to 
bonds of solidarity and collective action. In contrast to ‘power over’ it accentuates the 
opportunity of dialogue and collaboration to achieve certain goals.  
2. The ‘Who’ of Participation 
The realization of Fraser’s ‘all-subjected principle’ poses several practical challenges. Above 
all, disparities in the allocation of financial resources might hinder disadvantaged individuals 
from participating in deliberative processes (‘maldistribution’). People need money to attend 
meetings that do not take place in their immediate environment. They also need time, which is 
a very scarce resource for those who work long hours or pursue more than one job in order to 
sustain their families. Survival is an every day struggle for many people, which commands all 
their energy and attention. Without substantial redistributive efforts thus, spaces that are 
potentially open (‘invited spaces’), may nevertheless remain unoccupied. 
Redistribution is also necessary to alleviate unequal organizational capacities. Compared to 
the power of capital, non-economic stakeholders, most notably workers, lack the 
infrastructure that would allow them to pool their interests and to act as a single influential 
block. Local	  units,	  by	  themselves,	  are	  unable	  to	  solve	  problems	  of	  organization	  and	  NGOs	  
that	  could	  assume	  this	  task	  or	  at	  least	  offer	  assistance,	  face	  increasing	  financial	  
constraints	  and	  are	  discouraged	  by	  sponsors	  with	  no	  interest	  in	  political	  mobilization.	  At	  
the	  bottom	  of	  this	  predicament	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  what	  we	  have	  called	  ‘power	  with’	  –	  the	  ability	  
to	  build	  alliances	  and	  partnerships.	  In	  an	  ideal	  deliberative	  scenario,	  this	  should	  not	  
bother	  us	  since	  rules	  and	  procedures	  are	  designed	  to	  neutralize	  the	  effects	  of	  unequal	  
power	  through	  the	  leverage	  of	  common	  reason:	  ‘[T]he	  only	  power	  that	  prevails	  is,	  as	  
Habermas	  puts	  it	  the	  “force	  of	  the	  better	  argument”	  –	  and	  that	  is	  a	  force	  equally	  
available	  to	  all.’149	  Exactly	  this	  promise,	  however,	  is	  undermined	  by	  capital’s	  superior	  
ability	  to	  organize	  and	  effect	  public	  discourse	  via	  media,	  business	  chambers	  and	  funding	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of	  NGOs	  that	  disseminate	  their	  policy	  positions.	  If	  the	  often	  diverse,	  complex	  and	  
contradictory	  interests	  of	  non-­‐economic stakeholders are not coordinated and channelled	  
and	  if	  their	  capacity	  is	  not	  strengthened	  with	  a	  view	  to	  inform	  public	  opinion,	  
participatory	  processes	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  tilting	  entitlement	  in	  favour	  of	  those	  who	  are	  
already	  in	  better	  positions.   
The capacity and willingness of people to participate also depends on the stimulation of 
commitment and awareness. Many people are apathetic to politics and have long given up 
hope for significant change. They accept the circumstances under which they live and cannot 
even imagine a different future. Von Broembsen describes the importance of increasing what 
Marx has called ‘critical consciousness’ at the grassroots level.150 She argues that ‘… [a]n 
analysis of invisible power and the development of ‘power within’ is a precursor to the social 
mobilisation which is necessary for social transformation.’151 The most promising 
transformative strategies will be those that combine the creation of organizational capacities 
(‘power with’) and critical consciousness (‘invisible power’ and ‘power within’) not only for 
brief democratic moments but in a sustainable manner so that spaces that are open remain 
open and spaces that are closed are continuously challenged to become more open over time. 
An illustrative example of how this has been achieved in practice through a joint approach of 
political struggle and developmental activities is provided by the Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) in India. This trade union organizes informal women workers to 
strengthen their bargaining power vis-à-vis more organized employers and trading partners, 
but it also provides a wide range of services to increase the security of its members in terms of 
income, health, care, child support and shelter.152 SEWA is representative of over 1.4 million 
workers in the informal economy and has established a large web of affiliated organizations 
(over a hundred SEWA cooperatives, associations and companies) and specialized institutions 
such as SEWA Bank which provides micro credits to workers under favourable conditions 
(‘power with’).153 In contrast to many civil society organizations, SEWA also attempts to 
increase the critical consciousness and self-confidence of its members (‘power within’). 
Supported by SEWA, women workers are able to collectively challenge decision-making 
processes, practices and norms on the local, national, regional and even international level. 
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Impediments to inclusive participation can also take root in cultural hierarchies of status.154  
Gaventa teaches us that power imbalances are found on various levels which may operate 
independently of one other. Workers who hold shares in a company, for instance, may feel 
free to participate on a plant level or within union structures but they may fear retribution 
from their employers at a board level. This amounts to a form of ‘misrecognition’ which may 
also have implications for New Governance models where workers face their employers in 
direct deliberations. Obstacles to participation are also to be found in gender hierarchies. 
While the number of women in trade unions is constantly growing, their representation in 
decision-making bodies remains highly uneven.155 Patriarchal structures in unions and other 
civil society organizations may deem it normal and indeed appropriate for a handful of people 
- usually men – to exercise power. Attempts to unravel these and similar hierarchies of status 
are necessary for the effective functioning of participatory processes. 
As these examples suggest, inclusive participation is rendered illusionary without far-reaching 
interventions that combat ‘maldistribution’ and ‘misrecognition’. The challenges multiply 
should New Governance proponents seek to regulate spheres that affect large parts of a 
population. In such cases, forms of representation might indeed be more desirable than 
straightforward deliberations among thousands of people which are not only difficult to 
orchestrate but also unlikely to yield meaningful results. The main task then is to identify 
those bodies (or to create new ones) that are sufficiently representative and that are responsive 
to and in ongoing communication with their members. Unions and NGOs are candidates that 
come to mind, but they often do not fulfil either criterion.156  
A second, more purist, approach to the problem of scale would focus on the coordination of 
parallel local circles of deliberation and seek to aggregate their decisions. One might also 
entertain the possibility of a mixed system with different stages of deliberations: On a first 
level, groups of representatives would deliberate on certain principles, values or parameters to 
which local circles would be bound in their subsequent deliberations. This would tighten up 
and direct discussions which otherwise, given the quantity of participants, risk becoming 
futile. For instance in the context of codes of conduct, worker representatives and lead firms 
of global value chains might agree to a set of labour standards and appropriate mechanisms of 
enforcement which suppliers, contractors and workers further down the chain (who have 
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superior knowledge about local circumstances and specific needs) would then specify in more 
concrete terms.  
3. The ‘How’ of Participation 
The question of ‘how’ concerns the mechanisms of deliberative processes which differ 
substantially from alternative modes of policy making:  
‘Unlike strategic bargaining (in which outcomes are determined by the powers 
that parties bring to negotiations), hierarchical command (in which outcomes are 
determined according to the judgement of the highly placed), markets (in which 
money mediates outcomes), or aggregative voting (in which outcomes are 
determined according to the quantity of mobilized supporters), …’157 
deliberative processes encourage participants to persuade others with arguments that are based 
on reason. This does not mean that there is no legitimate role for emotions or the advancement 
of self-interest. On the contrary, much of the creative and transformative potential of 
deliberations depends on it. If people are offered a space where they can express their 
thoughts and emotions freely without the fear of being rejected and where they are allowed to 
challenge each other in sometimes heated debates they may come up with surprising ideas and 
solutions. New bonds and networks may also emerge during such experiences and - 
notwithstanding tangible outcomes - participants may acquire new skills, grow personally and 
become more powerful and responsible vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. In addition, deliberative 
processes may produce legal rules that are widely accepted. It is a natural phenomenon that 
people are more willing to accept and internalize rules they have helped to create.  
Deliberative processes require participants to adopt policy options which enjoy the widest 
possible support. In contrast to aggregative forms of voting where participants choose an 
option which is in line with their personal interests, deliberative practices require voters to 
consider ‘ … the reasonableness, fairness, or acceptability of that option to others.’158 To be 
sure, this is an ideal which no design structure will be able to provide with certainty but it is 
helpful as a goal and as a reminder at times when participations may reach a deadlock. The 
rules of discussions (timetables, demands for respect, requirements to listen, interdicts to 
interrupt speakers etc) may all be helpful under certain circumstances but they cannot, by 
themselves, guarantee that participants will deliberate and vote under the umbrella of reason 
and fairness. Much more important are commercial incentives, concrete pressures and the 
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foreclosure of exit options.159 It is here where New Governance scholars need to further 
explore possibilities and experiment in new directions.  
The fact that backgrounds vary between participants should not be regarded as a hindrance to 
successful deliberations. As long as disparities in wealth and cultural status do not reach 
levels where some are excluded from participation or dominated in extreme ways (see the 
previous section), different background conditions may create synergies of the kind that help 
solve complex problems. From a power perspective, moreover, it stands to reason that some 
imbalances will indeed, as Habermas argues, be disciplined by the design structure of 
deliberations which is centred on the premise of reason.  
However, the very design structure itself may create new power imbalances which need to be 
assessed. If reason is the central point of reference, those who have superior deliberative skills 
and access to information may enjoy unfair advantages over others.160 Case studies indicate 
that these problems exist but that their weight should not be overstated.161 Much information 
will be revealed during the process of deliberation itself and thus becomes freely available to 
everyone in attendance. Moreover, if we build the organizational capacities mentioned in the 
previous section, information asymmetries will, to some degree, be mitigated as well.  
The fear that benefits might accrue to the rhetorically talented has often been successfully 
addressed by training programs.162 These programs are also an essential part of the 
organizational capacity that needs to be considered as a precondition for fair and equal 
participation. Here again, it is important that issues are not tackled in isolation from other 
concerns. Training must be an integral node to address different dimensions of power. On the 
one hand, it should aim to build argumentative capacities (‘power to’ or ‘power over’), but on 
the other hand it should also provide political education (‘power within’, ‘invisible power’) 
while simultaneously fostering solidarity (‘power with’).  
Training programs are necessary for yet another reason. Under certain circumstances, they 
may function as a shield against the tendency of New Governance schemes to become 
dominated by economic models.163 Fischl argues that neo-liberal ideology has undermined the 
vocabulary of legal professionals and made economic parlance into something of a ‘lingua 
franca’.164 Wherever economic models take the stage, the deceptive spectre of scientific 
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accuracy follows suit. This can obscure value judgments and depoliticise contested issues (in 
particular when they are framed as mere technical problems).165 Progressive legal reformers 
who claim ‘… again and again that a commitment to market ordering entails this or that 
progressive intervention …’ reinforce rather than challenge this trend.166 Training programs 
must therefore resist what Fischl calls the ‘… thrill of using “the master’s tools” against 
him… ’167 and look beyond the apparent inevitability of economic conclusions with a view to 
preparing participants for a normative engagement with economic stakeholders. 
3. The ‘What’ of Participation 
In this section we enter the terrain of ‘hidden power’ which determines which debates are 
taking place and who has a say in them. In Fraser’s ideal world, such issues are resolved 
democratically – a goal which stands in sharp contrast to current political practices. A strategy 
which seeks to work incrementally towards Fraser’s ideal would have to face neo-liberal 
ideology on the level of ideas and increase acceptance of the ‘all-subjected principle’ itself via 
political struggle.  
In an important article, Somers and Block explain how neo-liberal ideas have come to be so 
dominant and resistant in the face of empirical contradictions.168 One of their most salient 
findings is that these ideas ‘… do not have to be rooted in specific historical circumstances to 
exert powerful influence.’169 They rely ‘… on abstract thought experiments and naturalistic 
models that have no empirical referents.’170 Thereby, they ‘… create entirely alternative 
definitions of reality and rationality.’171  
Compared to this overarching and homogeneous vision, progressive endeavours lack a 
compelling and unifying counter-narrative. The ‘all-subjected principle’ could in my opinion 
be the missing link – a common denominator - between many seemingly disparate reformist 
endeavours and a powerful ethical model against the naturalistic misconceptions of market 
fundamentalism. The fact that those who are affected by structures or arrangements should be 
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given a voice in their design is so intuitively intelligible and carries such moral force that the 
burden of proof should reside with those who argue for an alternative concept.  
To be sure, ideas alone will not suffice to bring labour issues on policy agendas if they are not 
combined with concrete pressures by civil society groups. Conversely, however, social 
movements that seek to bring specific issues on agendas without questioning the underlying 
normative assumptions of neo-liberalism will only scratch the surface and will not succeed in 
eradicating the structural causes of agenda denial. Civil society groups will therefore have to 
engage more proactively with New Governance scholars in places such as the World Social 
Forum, the ILO or the UN (which are more receptive to progressive ideas than the WTO, the 
IFIs or other organizations) to develop strategies that tackle institutions which are out of 
synch with Fraser’s ‘all-subjected principle’ (journals, policy circles, the media and economic 
networks).  
In practice, activists, civil society groups and progressive labour lawyers have used different 
strategies to push work-related issues on the agendas of national governments and 
international organizations, such as social mobilization, the use of media or other means of 
communication, and lobbying within governments, international organizations and policy 
networks, and attempts to link labour issues to larger concerns, such as social stability and 
peace, so as to increase awareness of regulatory problems. Thereby, their efforts have been 
met by strategies of resistance by capital, which endeavours to keep issues off the policy 
tables.172  
It has already been mentioned in the previous chapter that most New Governance models rely 
on a minimum commitment from the state for their effective functioning. Thus, for these 
models to be used in a progressive way, political struggle to influence agenda setting is an 
indispensable element. However, once states provide the legal background rules for 
negotiations, New Governance models themselves may serve as powerful tools to promote 
alternative ideas and increase awareness of regulatory deficits. If capacity deficits of non-
economic stakeholders are addressed, deliberative processes will allow workers to engage 
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with employers, corporations and state officials on equal terms. Participants will be in a 
position to contest ‘visible’, ‘invisible’ and ‘hidden’ forms of power by exerting pressure on 
one another. Claims of one group will thus shape that of other groups and vice versa. The 
inclusion of the state represents a vertical link (from the local to the national level) whereas the 
connections between different private stakeholders provide horizontal links which could, as I have 
indicated above, be further expanded through networks between different New Governance 
schemes.  
The question of ‘what’ also urges us to ask whether certain issues should not be subject to the 
forms of deliberations that the proposed New Governance models advocate. Kolben argues 
that severe power imbalances require ‘… rights discourse and concrete rights protections 
backed by an effective state apparatus and rule of law to ensure their respect and 
enforcement.’173 New Governance scholars on the other hand have argued for the supremacy 
of their approach vis-à-vis a rights regime:  
‘The reassertion of facially straightforward rights cannot make a complex 
situation simple, or avoid the need for ongoing and explicit principles-based 
problem-solving that is designed to handle complexity. New governance needs to 
be understood as a response to those very real problems.’174 
What can we make of these diverging positions? For one, New Governance cannot deny the 
importance of certain rights without getting enmeshed in contradictions. True democratic 
debates could scarcely take place if freedom of thought and expression, the right to assemble, 
freedom of the press and protections against discrimination were not guaranteed. In the 
context of work, freedom of association is arguably the most fundamental principle for 
meaningful participatory processes but we could equally make a case for other labour rights 
such as a living wage and even the right to withhold labour without the fear of losing a job.  
There are furthermore good reasons to advance human rights for the protection of minorities 
whose interests would otherwise be at risk of being neglected by a majority vote. However, 
human rights have often been of little help to people who either lack the knowledge or the 
financial means to make use of them or who face constraints from ineffective national courts. 
Moreover, human rights have proven quite unsuccessful on the social and economic front and 
are facing increasing problems with emerging forms of interdependency.175 The solution then 
can only be a system where human rights and New Governance models complement rather 
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than substitute each other and where the merits of each approach are assessed carefully in the 
context of a given regulatory problem. Progressive lawyers, unions and other civil society 
groups which could make use of New Governance techniques need to work in partnership 
with human rights scholars and activists (‘power with’) to strengthen the overall protection of 
people.  
To summarize this chapter: Without a comprehensive examination of existing power relations 
and specific interventions that target power imbalances (redistributive efforts and measures 
against unequal status), the democratic strategy that I have elaborated will not bring about the 
fundamental change that it aspires to. New Governance scholars have often shied away from 
engaging with issues of power, but if we would like to use New Governance models in a 
participatory and transformative way we cannot shirk the question of power and will have to 
face it head on.  
The next, slightly shorter, chapter will ask how the approach that I have developed in the 
course of this thesis can be applied in practice to produce ‘parity of participation’ for workers 





































VI. REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS  
This chapter will make use of a value chain analysis (CVA) to highlight how processes and 
relationships are organized in the context of global production networks. Particular attention 
will be paid to working conditions and protections of workers. Fraser’s concepts of 
‘redistribution’, ‘recognition’, and ‘representation’ will serve as the benchmark against which 
workers’ relative positions in global production networks are assessed from a normative point 
of view. Following this, the thesis will suggest how the New Governance strategy developed 
in chapters four and five could be applied in this context to improve the rights and working 
conditions of various categories of workers.  
1. Value Chain Analysis 
The emergence of transnational corporations has transformed the nature of trade in the 
globalizing world. Large retailers and successful brand-name merchandisers are sourcing 
products or components from suppliers in foreign countries to whom they often have only 
weak ‘legal ties’ in form of commercial contracts.176 Although this development has produced 
new jobs in developing countries much employment at the lower end of the supply chains 
tends to be flexible and informal with workers facing poor employment conditions and 
lacking legal and social protections.177 Powerful global buyers are able to dictate product 
standards and shift risks and responsibilities down the chain to suppliers who are under 
constant pressure to ensure steady delivery, maximized efficiency, high quality of goods and 
who also have to respond to changing consumer demands. While the corporation exploits its 
position by extracting a large part of the returns that are generated in the economic process, 
suppliers are dependent on cheap and flexible labour to remain competitive and to meet the 
diverse requirements set by the lead firm.  
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To understand the highly complex relationships between different parties in the production 
chains as well as the economic processes that take place within them we can draw on a body 
of work which has been termed ‘value chain analysis’. Its origin can be traced back to the 
French ‘filière’ approach (1960s) which was used to highlight physical commodity flows in 
the agricultural sector (albeit confined to the domestic sphere) and to the Global Commodity 
Chains framework which was developed by Gereffi and others in the 1990s to analyse the 
impact of globalization on production processes.178 The latter approach was itself influenced 
by the work of Immanuel Wallerstein who saw commodity chains not only as a feature of 
production but as a network with implications for social forces in a world system.179 The term 
‘value chain’ was introduced by Michael Porter who examined how certain company 
activities could add value to services and products.180 It was only in 2000, however, when 
researchers from various disciplines met for a series of workshops that the concept of value 
chain analysis (VCA) began to take shape.181 Subsequent workshops and publications further 
developed the theoretical underpinning of the framework and applied the new ideas to diverse 
case studies.182  
Value chain analysis follows products from their conception to their final use and explores the 
value that is added during the production process through activities by lead firms and their 
trading partners. ‘This includes activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution 
and support to the final consumer.’183 The value chain framework thus serves as a tool for 
exploring the interrelationships between connected firms and the flows of resources, 
information and power between them. It works on an intra and inter-firm level, is industry-
independent and can be applied across the boundaries of nation states which is essential since 
many production networks operate across great distances.  
The area of value chain analysis that has received the most theoretical and empirical attention 
thus far is ‘governance’. It concerns the ways in which firms coordinate their activities and 
describes how knowledge, information and material is allocated within the value chain.184 
Some particular questions stand at the centre of the discussion: Who specifies which goods 
are produced? What are the terms of their production (product standards, product quantity and 
price, working conditions etc)? And at what time and where are they produced? As a 
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consequence, this branch of value chain analysis is fundamentally concerned with power and 
the distribution of gains within the production chain.185  
Another area of value chain scholarship which is interesting for our purposes concerns the 
concept of economic and social ‘upgrading’.186 Scholars writing within this field explore 
possibilities to improve the relative position of actors in the production process. Whereas 
economic upgrading is about enhancing efficiency and innovation of firms, social upgrading 
focuses on decent work, labour standards, rights and social protection.187  Although value 
chain analysis mostly evolves around firms, this bottom up approach has the potential to 
incorporate the role of workers, households, communities etc into the overall framework.  
The next section will build on work by von Broembsen who proposes Fraser’s theory as a 
new narrative for labour law.188 Part of her argument is that a conceptual shift from the 
employment relationship to a value chain analysis would foster ‘parity of participation’. I will 
explain and further develop this idea by answering two questions: What can a value chain 
analysis contribute to a discussion about ‘representation’, ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ 
and what does Fraser’s theory tell us about the working conditions within value chains?  
2. The Situation of Workers in Global Production Networks  
Value chain analysis can help to identify all those who work within a chain of production and 
provide an overview of their working conditions. From this analysis we can draw who does 
and who does not enjoy ‘representation’. At one end of the spectrum there are those with 
formal and permanent employment who are more likely to be represented by a union and to 
enjoy freedom of association, and on the other end there are those with informal and more 
flexible employment who often lack representation and the right to associate. Barrientos 
argues that even within a single firm, conditions of work can vary significantly. Suppliers ‘… 
maintain a core of regular workers who are able to provide quality of production through their 
acquired skills and experience, but to meet fluctuating orders they complement this with the 
use of casual, temporary and contract employment as needed.’189  
An extended value chain analysis could also provide information about the status order of 
actors within production networks. There are already alarming statistics which indicate that 
women are increasingly concentrated in informal, flexible and low-paid arrangements.190  
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‘Embedded labour market discrimination has traditionally restricted women’s 
access to full time permanent employment. Women are seen as ‘flexible’ in that 
they can move between paid productive and unpaid reproductive work in the 
home as dictated by fluctuating needs of global production.’191 
Women therefore suffer from status inequality in the sense that their gender prevents them 
from accessing full-time, formal and decent work. A value chain analysis that is concerned 
with social upgrading will need to take status dimensions into account, if it is to improve the 
well-being of workers in global production networks. 
Von Broembsen argues that informality itself is a form of ‘misrecognition’ which denies 
many workers and businesses equal status.192 Those firms that are registered and those 
workers who possess an employment contract enjoy advantages such as enforceable contracts, 
private property rights, tax breaks, access to subsidies, membership in associations, protection 
against creditors, clear insolvency rules and social protection.193 Without stretching the 
concept of ‘recognition’ too far, we should include three further categories of workers that are 
facing unequal status: Migrants, children and (in)dependent contractors. Migrants are 
increasingly locked into abusive, exploitative and even dangerous work arrangements. Their 
vulnerability stems from a legal status inequality (the threat of deportation often looms in the 
background as a fear which employers can take advantage of) but ethnic or racial 
discrimination may also feed into it. Children are by their very nature more vulnerable and an 
easy target for intimidation and control. Despite widespread rhetoric against child labour, 
children are still used as a cheap workforce in many production networks.194 In contrast to the 
aforementioned forms of status asymmetries, here we face a situation where rules should 
work so as to respect and protect rather than to dismantle unequal status. (In)dependent 
contractors, finally, are enterprises that are regularly treated as employers by law although 
they may have much more in common with employees (economic dependency, little 
bargaining power).195 Small scale and individual enterprises are often struggling to survive 
among stronger competitors and would benefit greatly from the legal status afforded to 
employees (which would for instance entitle them to bargain collectively). 
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Lastly, on the topic of ‘redistribution’, a value chain analysis offers a broader picture than the 
typical employer-employee lens underpinning most labour laws.196 Issues of ‘redistribution’ 
are not played out exclusively in the relationships between suppliers and their immediate 
workers, but along a lengthy vertical line which includes the lead firm, suppliers, trading 
partners, intermediaries, affiliates, contractors and related workers. Value chain analyses 
confirm that lead firms are able to extract a majority of the gains of production although the 
largest share of market value is created by other actors. Through standards and production 
specifications, lead firms set in motion a process where responsibilities and risks are shifted 
down from one level to the next until they reach the weakest links of the chain, the individual 
workers.  
The traditional goal of labour law has, as Otto Kahn-Freud famously put it, always been to 
‘… be a countervailing force to counter the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent 
and must be inherent in the employment relationship.’197 Employers are, by virtue of their 
property rights, in a better bargaining position than workers and the main task of labour law 
therefore is to devise rules that create a more level playing field. The rise of neo-liberalism, 
however, has not made this an easy task. Many workers fall outside the scope of labour laws, 
as do powerful lead firms which are frequently located in countries where national regulations 
are unable to reach them. What then could a strategy to produce ‘parity of participation’ for 
workers in global production networks look like? 
3. ‘Parity of Participation’ for Workers in Global Production Networks 
I have outlined the theoretical framework for a progressive New Governance model on the 
basis of Fraser’s theory in chapter four and five and will now attempt to apply this admittedly 
demanding concept to the context of production networks.  
As a first step, an alliance between workers, labour lawyers, NGOs, unions and other civil 
society groups would have to put substantial pressure on lead firms of global production 
networks to increase their willingness for negotiations. Major brand companies are vulnerable 
to negative publicity or consumer boycotts and will respond to such pressures for purely 
economic reasons. A multifaceted strategy would make use of the media and other social 
platforms to increase awareness of working conditions and the lack of legal and social 
protections of workers at the lower end of the value chain but it will also consider more 
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radical approaches such as strikes or marches. The higher the pressure, the more likely the 
lead firm is to enter into negotiations and the more likely it is that those issues will reach the 
policy table that can make a real difference. The New Governance model that I propose 
embraces the idea of the ‘all-subjected principle’ on a conceptual level (significant change is 
most likely to occur where stakeholders have a right to place any conceivable issue on the 
agenda that has a palpable impact on them) but its practical implementation will depend on 
various stakeholders to engage in political struggle. 
An alternative route would call for the involvement of states as powers that can provide the 
background rules for deliberations among various stakeholders in a global production 
network. This strategy is more promising in the context of lesser known companies that are 
not as vulnerable to consumer pressures. However, such an approach would require the 
involvement of more than just one state in situations where the lead firm is not located in the 
country of its suppliers. Political struggles that transcend national borders are particularly 
difficult to organize if workers in the home country of the lead firm are not negatively 
affected by its activities. However, if the basis of political struggles in the country where 
workers suffer the most intense forms of injustice is strong and pressure on the government is 
kept at high levels, this might induce the government of this country to approach the home 
country of the lead firm for assistance. A New Governance approach that is initiated by the 
concerted efforts of two or more states is not impossible since what is required are ‘only’ 
background rules that compel the lead firm to negotiate and not specific regulations that 
directly restructure entire value chains. 
In a second step, progressive labour lawyers, NGOs and unions would make use of value 
chain analysis to identify all actors likely to have an interest in deliberations (workers, lead 
firm, suppliers, intermediaries etc). Every worker would enjoy the same rights with regard to 
participation irrespective of whether he or she has an employment contract or the specific 
terms of that contract (‘all-subjected principle’). The previous chapter has argued that certain 
redistributive efforts and interventions (with regard to inequalities in cultural status) might be 
necessary to enable deliberative processes on equal terms, and to make sure that no one is 
unfairly excluded. The Indian trade union SEWA, for instance, has addressed such 
impediments to participation by strengthening the economic independence of informal women 
workers through the provision of small loans and through the creation of various cooperatives 
and producer associations. This trade union has also encouraged women to speak up for their 
interests and to engage in political struggles despite deeply entrenched patriarchal structures 
and discrimination based on castes that had long made such efforts impossible. SEWA, 
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moreover, provides a good example of how NGOs, unions and other organizations (on their 
own or maybe in tandem with each other) could build the organizational capacity necessary 
for workers to engage with more organized and powerful economic stakeholders. Since its 
registration as a trade union in 1972 it has grown not only in terms of its membership but also 
with regard to its infrastructure. SEWA has established a dense network of affiliated 
organizations and specialized institutions that offer various services and that account for the 
growing relevance of this organization as a political player.  
Before deliberations take place, training programs are necessary to equip participants with the 
skills they need in deliberative processes (‘power to’). These programs should also serve as 
platforms to create critical consciousness (‘power within’) and solidarity (‘power with’) 
between workers and their allies. Most importantly, they should provide a forum where 
workers can come together to align their interests and to exchange information, experiences 
and ideas.  
Depending on the number of participants in the given global production network and the local 
dispersion of sub-companies, deliberations would either take place at one location or be 
organized in parallel circles. In the latter case, lead firms would have to send representatives 
to different plants to ensure that their interests are given due regard. The deliberative 
outcomes would then be aggregated by a mechanism that gives equal consideration to the 
results of each circle. The previous chapter has briefly discussed the possibility of a two-stage 
process that could be useful to tighten and direct deliberations. This scenario would require 
worker representatives and lead firms to agree on certain principles or benchmarks regarding 
the rights and protections of workers, but their specific content would be established through 
deliberations among suppliers and workers themselves.  
The results would finally be codified and endorsed by the lead firm and its suppliers. 
Enforcement mechanisms would depend on the route lawyers, workers, unions, NGOs and 
other civil society groups have chosen to take at the outset of the process. If their approach 
was based on consumer pressures they would need to make sure that interest in the activities 
of the lead firm does not wane. If their approach included the state they would need to put 
pressure on governments to institute effective enforcement measures. In any of the two cases, 
independent monitoring and effective complaints mechanisms should be in place to track 
progress in terms of worker protections and to ensure compliance with the endorsed 
standards.  
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The regulation of transnational corporations poses one of the most difficult challenges for 
labour lawyers, activists and civil society groups in a globalizing economy. This chapter has 
evaluated the situation of workers in the production networks of such companies through the 
lens of value chain analysis and Fraser’s theory of justice and has outlined how the proposed 
New Governance model could be applied to improve their position through political struggle, 
capacity building and deliberations.  
The final chapter will provide a critique of the ILO’s ‘decent work’ agenda and ask whether 
this concept or the proposed New Governance strategy carries more potential for legal and 


























VII. THE QUEST FOR DECENT WORK 
The ILO is still widely regarded as the most important international organization when it 
comes to labour and social matters. Many thinkers believe that no other organization has 
equal potential to further the interests of workers against globalizing forces in the future. 
What happens in this organization therefore is interesting insofar as it may pose a counter 
hegemonic strategy against neo-liberalism.  
For quite some time now the ILO advocates a multifaceted agenda which it has termed 
‘decent work’. With this program, the organization attempts to address deficits with regard to 
the protection and the wellbeing of workers in a global economy. This agenda deserves a 
refined analysis because it incorporates many of the major tools that the ILO has used in the 
past and because it claims to be a holistic concept that can transform work relationships in 
fundamental ways. This chapter will first provide a brief historical overview of the ILO’s 
activities followed by an exposition of the main principles of the ‘decent work’ agenda. It will 
then offer a critique of this agenda from the perspective of Fraser’s theory. Since ‘parity of 
participation’ is the normative foundation of the strategy that I propose a critique through 
Fraser’s lens will also facilitate a concluding comparison between this agenda and my own 
approach. 
1. The ILO’s ‘Decent Work’ Agenda 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) was established in 1919 to curb the negative 
effects of labour markets. It was, and still is, the only international organization that operates 
on a tripartite basis, involving trade unions, employer representatives and governments. In its 
early phase, the ILO was primarily a standard setter that produced conventions and 
recommendations on various labour and social matters. If a country ratifies a convention, it is 
obliged to issue periodic reports detailing the measures that have been undertaken to 
implement the convention and stating the progress that has been achieved in this regard. In 
addition, the ILO can investigate complaints about non-compliance, but its enforcement 
capacity is restricted to that of critique, and is therefore rather weak. Recommendations are 
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purely voluntary and are not subject to supervision. Over the years, the ILO has strengthened 
its role as a ‘knowledge agency’ by publishing statistics and participating in academic 
debates.198 It has also become a ‘development agency’ which provides technical assistance 
and consultative services on labour policies in member countries.199  
During the almost 100 years of its existence, the ILO’s relevance has undergone cyclical 
changes. The organization was highly influential in the post-war years when its conventions 
on discrimination, collective bargaining, freedom of association and social security 
contributed to the emergence of the welfare states.200 However, several normative 
assumptions which underpinned the activities of the ILO became subject of critique with the 
rise of neo-liberalism. This development and the withdrawal of the United States as its 
primary sponsor in the 70s posed a severe threat to the organization’s future and led to a 
radical reorientation.201 With some minor exceptions, the ILO refocused on poverty reduction 
as expressed in two theoretical concepts: ‘basic needs’ and the ‘informal economy’.202 While 
some commentators saw this as a sensible move to retain some relevance in a globalizing 
economy, critics accentuated the ILO’s lukewarm response to neo-liberal ideology, the labour 
flexibility debate and structural adjustment programs.203 After a short phase of reignited 
confidence in the late 80s (when the ILO was assigned a role in the restructuring of some 
Eastern European states) and some rather unsuccessful efforts to come to terms with newly 
emerging patterns of work,204 the ILO launched its Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work in 1998 which received much attention and prompted heated debates.205 
Shortly afterwards in 1999, the then Director-General Juan Somavia initiated the ‘decent 
work’ agenda, the ILO’s latest overarching attempt to deal with challenges wrought by 
globalizing forces. Somavia defined decent work as  
‘… productive work in which rights are protected, which generates an adequate 
income with adequate social protection. It also means sufficient work in the sense 
that all should have access to income earning opportunities. It marks the high road 
to economic and social development, a road in which employment, income and 
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social protection can be achieved without compromising workers’ rights and 
sound standards.’206 
The theoretical concept which undergirds decent work (the ‘decent work’ agenda) consists of 
four pillars: 
1. The promotion of standards and rights at work: Conventions and recommendations remain 
key strategies in the promotion of decent work. Thus far, the ILO has adopted 189 
conventions and 202 recommendations.207 In addition, it has endorsed other texts such as the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the Declaration on Social 
Justice for a Fair Globalization.  
2. The creation of employment opportunities: Decent work combines labour standards with 
job opportunities. The agenda advocates greater cooperation between states on a global level 
and active market policies on a national level to produce the jobs that are needed for people to 
earn a living. 
3. The improvement of social protection: Decent work seeks to protect workers from the risks 
and contingencies at work. Social security, pensions and health insurance are seen as ‘basic 
rights’ (enshrined in many conventions) and conducive to growth and economic 
productivity.208 A significant challenge for this agenda is to extend social protection to very 
vulnerable groups such as migrants, informal workers and those affected by AIDS.  
4. The strengthening of social dialogue: Social dialogue includes various types of formal and 
informal engagements between governments, employer and worker representatives 
(consultations, negotiations, deliberations, cooperations etc). It can take place on global, 
national, regional or enterprise level and attempts to promote the other three pillars.  
Some commentators have welcomed the ILO’s new initiative. Huges and Haworth, for 
instance, argue that it has enabled the ILO to forge stronger relationships with other 
international organizations such as the IFIs which has led to ‘…“regime integration” within 
global governance.’209 Others have been less forthcoming in their assessment and this thesis 
will follow in their footsteps, not by providing completely new insights, but by applying a 
new lens (Fraser’s theory of Justice) to scrutinize the ‘decent work’ agenda.210  
2. A Critique of the ‘Decent Work’ Agenda  
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From a conceptual viewpoint there are some interesting similarities between the ‘decent 
work’ agenda and Fraser’s theory of justice. Both frameworks use a single normative 
principle to define their main goal and a combination of several interlinked individual 
subparts to realize it. However, the similarities end there. Whereas the individual subparts in 
Fraser’s theory are themselves autonomous theoretical concepts which complement each 
other in a sensible manner, most subparts of the decent work agenda derive from concrete 
strategies the ILO has pursued in the past and their combination appears more arbitrary. One 
might question for instance whether the categories of social dialogue or social protection 
could not be subsumed under the first pillar, namely the promotion of standards and rights. 
The differences between the two concepts of course become more pronounced if we take a 
closer look at their content.  
Fraser’s concept demands that everyone who is affected by a given ‘governance structure’ 
must enjoy the same political ‘representation’ with regard to it. The ILO’s emphasis on work, 
rather than labour and its conventions on home workers and domestic workers indicate the 
organization’s intention to move beyond traditional concepts of employment and to provide 
decent standards for everyone including those in the informal economy. However, as far as 
‘representation’ is concerned, the ILO’s tripartite structure falls short of Fraser’s requirement. 
Those worker and employer representatives that form the Governing Body of the ILO (unions 
and members of the International Organization of Employers (IOE)) are not nearly as 
representative as one would expect. Worker representatives can only claim to speak for a tiny 
fraction of the population, namely those who belong to a union (which is not the case for most 
workers in the informal economy and service industry). Likewise, those bodies that act on 
behalf of employers are not representative of most small scale enterprises in developed and 
developing countries whose interests diverge substantially from their bigger competitors. The 
ILO’s tripartite structure thus poses a serious threat to the goal of decent work for everybody 
since only equal political ‘representation’ can guarantee that different categories of workers 
receive equal attention.211 There has been some debate within the ILO about granting NGOs 
and other civil society organizations access to the Governing Body but these attempts have 
quickly been suppressed by workers and employers alike who feared a loss of influence.212 
NGOs continue to play a significant role in field programs but as far as decision-making in 
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the headquarters is concerned the power rests exclusively with unions, governments and 
members of the IOE.213  
A second objective of Fraser is the prohibition of status inequalities which prevent people 
from participating in social life as peers. ‘Decent work’ addresses such shortcomings through 
conventions on discrimination. The Discrimination Convention No. 111 of 1958 and the 
Equal Remuneration Convention No. 100 of 1951 are among the most ratified Conventions of 
the ILO (No. 111 has been ratified by 172 states, No. 100 by 171 states). Convention No. 100 
promotes equal remuneration for women and men but it does not account for wage disparities 
that are rooted in other forms of unequal cultural status. Convention No. 111 is significantly 
broader in scope. Article 2 states: 
Each Member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to declare and 
pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national 
conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of 
employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in 
respect thereof.214 
As important as these two conventions are they cannot address more subtle forms of 
discrimination that pervade the modern workplace and that are the result of informal norms, 
corporate culture, training, evaluation etc.215 Moreover, anti-discrimination rules do not 
always yield the desired effects on the local level (communities and households) where 
cultural hierarchies can be deeply entrenched and where other more direct forms of 
intervention may prove far more successful.  
In a previous section of this thesis the concept of ‘recognition’ has been extended to include 
informal workers, children, migrants and independent contractors. The ‘decent work’ agenda, 
at least conceptually, incorporates informal workers into its framework but it also makes clear 
that countries are not required ‘… to extent the same level of statutory entitlements, 
protections and benefits afforded to standard workers to all workers in need of protection.’216 
This might well lead to situations where the relative position of informal workers is improved 
but where, in contrast to Fraser’s theory, interaction on equal terms remains impossible. The 
ILO has pushed for the integration of decent work into the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
of the IFIs and has itself launched field programs (the latest being the Decent Work Country 
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Programmes) to further the agenda for decent work. While the impact of these programs on 
the informal sector is yet to be assessed, the ILO has also, albeit in very limited form and with 
very ineffective results, tried to respond to the challenge of informality through its standard 
setting activity. The Home Work Convention No. 177 of 1996 has been ratified by only 10 
states, the Domestic Workers Convention No. 189 of 2011 by only 11 states and a convention 
on contract labour was eventually dropped due to resistance by the employer faction of the 
ILO.217  
Children are protected by the Minimum Age Convention No. 138 (166 ratifications) of 1973 
and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention No. 182 (178 ratifications) of 1999. Part of 
the decent work agenda, moreover, is the ILO’s International Programme on the Elimination 
of Child Labour (IPEC) which seeks to progressively eradicate child labour in the world 
through country-based programs, awareness raising strategies and qualitative research.218 
Statistics show a significant reduction of child labour in the last decade but the situation in 
many countries is complex and much more effort is required to reach the IPEC’s goal.219 
Despite their growing number and increasing influence on labour markets, migrants are one of 
the most neglected categories of workers in the ILO. It is estimated that there are 
approximately 175 million migrants around the world with about 15 per cent having illegal 
status.220 Migrants, like informal workers in general, are not represented within the Governing 
Body. The Migration for Employment Convention No. 97 of 1949 and the Migrant Workers 
(Supplementary Provisions) Convention No. 143 of 1975 are only ratified by 49 states (many 
having elected to exclude certain provisions) and 23 states respectively and are in urgent need 
of revision.221  
A category of workers which has received even less attention in the ILO’s ‘decent work’ 
agenda are (in)dependent contractors. Worker representatives view them as employers and are 
unwilling to improve their position at the possible expense of workers. Employer 
representatives are even more reluctant to take the interests of this group seriously. Larger 
companies that are able to do business with (in)dependent contractors can avoid the 
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responsibilities and risks associated with hiring employees. (In)dependent contractors are not 
entitled to labour protections, their income depends entirely on their own efforts (instead of a 
fixed salary), and they have no right to bargain collectively or be part of a union.222 
Over decades, the ILO has promoted sectoral or centralized collective bargaining between 
labour and capital as a way of shifting resources from one party to another.  This founding 
principle has been revised through the concept of social dialogue. Standing has criticized the 
new notion for its vagueness and argues that it does not ‘… imply any constitutional right of 
association or right of collective bargaining.’223 This argument is not wholly convincing since 
the Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining are 
still in place and considered as fundamental. To be sure, the notion of social dialogue cannot 
substitute more adversarial forms of collective bargaining but it can provide a sensible 
extension of that concept which is necessary in the face of new patterns of work and the 
declining influence of unions.224 It remains to be seen whether social dialogue is merely used, 
as Standing worries, to spur dialogue or whether it is harnessed to create institutionalized 
forms of engagement with broad stakeholder participation. 
‘Redistribution’ (Fraser’s third dimension) can also be realized through labour standards. 
Building up social entitlements and rights such as pensions, unemployment benefits, medical 
aid, maternity leave, disability benefits, assurances of adequate income etc shift resources 
from employers to employees.225 However, low levels of ratification have seriously 
compromised the ILO’s standard setting activities in recent decades. As a response to this 
predicament, the ILO refocused on basic principles and approved the Declaration of 
Fundamental Principles of Rights at Work in 1998 which identified four core labour 
standards: Freedom of association, the prohibition of all forms of forced labor, elimination of 
the worst forms of child labor and non-discrimination in employment. The declaration applies 
to all ILO member states irrespective of whether they have ratified the conventions to which 
the declaration refers. Critics have argued that the standards enshrined in the declaration are 
too open-ended and that governments can easily adhere to these standards without having to 
change their regulatory systems.226 It has also been stated that the exclusion of social and 
economic concerns and the focus on ‘process’ rather than ‘result-oriented’ standards 
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constitutes a fatal omission which reinforces free market ideology.227 The most crucial 
shortcoming, however, in my opinion, is the strictly promotional character of the declaration. 
The follow up mechanism consists of two completely ineffective elements: First, member 
states which have not ratified the core conventions are to submit annual reports about their 
improvements. Second, the ILO issues a global report which provides an overview of the state 
of implementation. There is no complaints mechanism, no supervision and no substantial 
critique if states do not comply.  
3. Decent Work and New Governance 
The ILO’s experiments with soft law mechanisms bring the organization closer to ideas that 
have long been established in the New Governance movement. However, most scholars in this 
field of research would not subscribe to the manner and degree of softness that is epitomized 
by the ILO’s declaration. In their models, and I include my own submission here, some form 
of hard law is always present while softness is used carefully and only at selected places.228 
This insight is key to understanding the nature of New Governance as not a covert form of 
deregulation but a ‘…formalizing, reason-seeking [and] indeed law-seeking project.’229  
There is another important distinction to be drawn between my own New Governance-based 
approach and the ‘decent work’ agenda more generally. Although both frameworks have a 
largely procedural basis, the ‘decent work’ agenda is unlikely to translate into substantive 
outcomes because it does not address the preconditions that are necessary for such a 
transformation. The approach advanced by this thesis requires that power asymmetries on 
various levels are addressed through political struggle (by workers, progressive lawyers, 
unions and other civil society groups) and the simultaneous creation of non-economic 
capacities in order to ensure first, that all people with legitimate interests in the issues at hand 
are included in participatory processes, second, that the terms of bargaining allow for any and 
all possible outcomes and third, that there is no restrictions set on subject matter. Insofar as 
the ‘decent work’ agenda relies on social dialogue and collective bargaining (and there is 
some purchase to this argument seeing that socio-economic rights are largely sidelined) it 
cannot yield any positive effects for workers unless power imbalances which prevent 
participants from making meaningful use of these instruments are taken into account. The 
‘decent work’ agenda, however, does not sufficiently address obstacles to participation. It 
does not support capacity-building of non-economic stakeholders and neither does it redress 
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all the forms of ‘maldistribution’ and ‘misrecognition’ which prevent people from 
participation on equal terms. The agenda, moreover, lacks any sense of political struggle. The 
realization of the preconditions for fair and equal participation requires political pressure on 
various national and international spheres which a simple right to organize cannot substitute 
for.  
To sum up, this chapter has scrutinized one of the key initiatives of the ILO – the ‘decent 
work’ agenda – through the lens of Fraser’s theory of justice. Despite some positive results 
(primarily in the realm of ‘recognition’), the initiative has revealed serious deficits with 
regard to all three dimensions of Fraser’s concept. The approach that has been developed in 
this thesis as an alternative to conventional forms of national and international regulation is 
based on Fraser’s procedural component of ‘parity of participation’ and is thus able to avoid 
several pitfalls of the ‘decent work’ agenda. Both my own approach and the ‘decent work’ 
agenda are largely based on participation. However, only my approach gives equal voice to 
everybody who is affected by the regulatory issues it attempts to address and accentuates the 




















Neo-liberalism has produced incredible wealth for a tiny fraction of the global population and 
decreased security for the majority. Million of workers face poor working conditions and have 
no access to legal and social protection. They live in a state of constant anxiety and are 
extremely vulnerable to shocks such as unemployment, ill health and deflation. There is little 
reason to assume that exclusive reliance upon the traditional regulatory instruments and 
practices of states and international organizations will bring about a palpable improvement for 
workers in the foreseeable future. These institutions manifestly lack the capacity and the will 
for radical change and barely include the most disadvantaged stakeholders in their decision-
making processes.  
New Governance offers an alternative route to progressive lawyers, activists and civil society 
groups that are interested in democratic strategies for social change. Scholars in this field have 
seldom explored the transformative potential of this approach on a larger scale and few have 
seen the possibilities of developing it into a project that could challenge neo-liberal 
dominance. This thesis has sought to fill this gap by linking New Governance to a global 
theory of justice. Nancy Fraser provides a compelling counter-narrative to market 
fundamentalism that could lay the groundwork for integrating struggles against structural 
causes of injustice into New Governance models. Her framework consists of three interrelated 
claims (‘representation’, ‘recognition’ and ‘redistribution’) which serve the common goal of 
creating a setting where people are able to ‘… interact with one another as peers.’230 
Incorporating this theory into New Governance models would require its scholars to embrace 
two ideas: First, they would have to make participation one of their foremost concerns. 
Fraser’s ‘all-subjected principle’ requires every person potentially affected by a policy to have 
a voice in its creation. Second, they would have to be willing to move across boundaries of 
nation states to challenge transnational corporations, the financial market and the governance 
structure of the global economy. This thesis has given more attention to the first of these two 
ideas. It has analysed obstacles to participation on the basis of a power analysis and indicated 
possible ways to address such concerns.  
                                                
230 Fraser 2010, 365. 
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The requirements necessary for broad, inclusive and fair participation are demanding but so is 
every concept that aims to change societal structures in fundamental ways. In a nutshell, the 
model I have proposed would require redistribute and anti-discriminatory efforts to make sure 
that everyone is able to attend participatory processes. It would furthermore require capacity 
building by non-economic stakeholders to mitigate gross power imbalances between highly 
organized capital and largely unorganized workers. NGOs, unions or other organizations 
would have to assume the role of coordinating workers. Training programs would endow 
participants with the skills required for deliberative processes but they would also serve the 
purpose of creating critical consciousness and solidarity among individuals. Most importantly, 
such programs would constitute a forum where workers and their allies could come together 
to align their interests and to exchange information, experiences and ideas. These spaces 
could also be used for other purposes and become permanent democratic institutions for civic 
engagement.  
There is a real danger that economic stakeholders will only engage in New Governance 
processes if they see an advantage for themselves. Progressive lawyers, activists and civil 
society groups will therefore need to develop strategies to bring them to the policy table and 
to foreclose exit options. In a number of cases this has been achieved successfully through the 
creation of substantial consumer pressure (codes of conduct). Mostly, however, New 
Governance models will require involvement from the state that is able to compel 
stakeholders to enter into dialogues with other groups and that has the power to create 
background rules which come into effect if negotiations fail. Both scenarios hint at what is 
arguably the biggest challenge for New Governance (and any other theoretical framework that 
attempts to influence public policy): The mobilization of physical and intellectual forces to 
bring issues to bear on policy agendas.  
Neo-liberalism has transformed the way in which people today think, talk and act and it has 
established itself as the only possible reality. Progressive groups have fought on different 
fronts against this form of fundamentalism but they have as of yet not been able to unite their 
efforts and agree on a common counter-narrative. I have argued that Fraser’s ‘all-subjected 
principle’ could serve as such a unifying concept.  
But political campaigns do not only subsist on powerful ideas. They draw sustenance from 
their ‘physicality’. By this I mean both the size of the group that pushes the issue but also its 
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visibility, which are two distinct phenomena.231 The term visibility is used here to denote the 
importance of using the media - television, newspaper, radio and internet - to convey 
messages to a broader audience but it also refers to protest action and marches which have 
often proved immensely important for the success of political campaigns. Ideas and 
‘physicality’ are interrelated concepts: The size of a group may depend on the persuasiveness 
of ideas. Similarly, the more powerful ideas are, the more likely people will resort to methods 
that increase their visibility.232 Ideas on the other hand need a medium (a physical group) that 
transports, develops and propagates them. 
The size of a group is fundamentally a question of solidarity. Guy Standing has recently 
published a book in which he argues that globalization has splintered old and produced new 
class structures.233 He identifies seven groups with class features and analyses one in 
particular in greater depth: ‘the Precariat’234 which is comprised of all those who do casual, 
often informal work characterized by low incomes and high levels of insecurity.235 Although 
this class is heterogeneous and still in a stage of formation ( ‘… [it] is a class-in-the-making, 
if not yet a class-for-itself , in the Marxian sense of that term’) people within it share vastly 
similar experiences of frustration and anxiety.236 Standing argues that this class poses a threat 
to the stability of societies:  
‘Tensions within the precariat are setting people against each other, preventing 
them from recognising that the social and economic structure is producing their 
common set of vulnerabilities. Many will be attracted by populist politicians and 
neo-fascist messages, a development already clearly visible across Europe, the 
United States and elsewhere.’237 
This is not an inevitable outcome. If progressive thinkers and activists can realign their efforts 
along an agenda such as Fraser’s ‘all-subjected principle’ and prompt people of the precariat 
to see themselves in one another (which is the essence of solidarity), and if they succeed in 
turning the precariat’s frustration into a productive rather than destructive force, it might well 
be possible to forge broad and powerful coalitions between workers in different parts of the 
world against global forces of oppression. 
                                                
231 A group with common interests can be huge, but people outside the group may nevertheless not know that 
this group exists or that it shares certain ideas. 
232 Visibility is of course also dependent on the resources a group has at its disposal. 
233 Standing 2011, 7. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid 7, 19. 
237 Ibid., 25. 
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In closing, a final thought on democracy: It has been mentioned occasionally throughout the 
thesis that New Governance has considerable potential to enhance democratic structures. If 
we are to take seriously what figures prominently in so many constitutions and what is 
proclaimed by the South African Freedom Charter, namely that ‘The people shall govern!’238, 
then we have to depart from a form of democracy that focuses primarily on electoral 
participation and we have to look elsewhere for more continuous and vital ways of engaging 
people with political life. For the most part, the electorate’s democratic rights amount to little 
more than the approval of a party-selected candidate or, as it is practice in many countries, a 
slate of candidates. These choices do not tell us anything substantial about individual 
preferences or needs and neither do they further a sense of ownership or responsibility. The 
problem is exacerbated in a neo-liberal age where the credibility of many political parties is 
seriously questioned by their proximity to big corporations and financial institutions.  
The thesis has mainly focused on issues of work but it has also indicated that the proposed 
New Governance strategy could generate legal rules in other spheres of human interaction. If 
we are to use New Governance as a democratic approach we would have to assess how it can 
play out in various areas of social life and how we would institutionalize it – problems that 
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